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HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH COURTS TO THE
JUDICATURE ACTS
b. The Prerogative Courts (Continued)
THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS
The "Courts Christian", or ecclesiastical courts, formed a complete
judicial system which administered a law of its own, the ius commune
(common law) of the church, or canon law.M14 This law was based
upon the Corpus Juris Canonici, which derived from the Roman Law.
As we have seen, the separation of the spiritual and temporal juris-
dictions of the ancient communal courts"' is generally credited to the
famous ordinance of William the Conqueror about 1072. "IT ]he
*Copyright, 1932, by George Jarvis Thompson. This article is the third and
final installment of Part I of a historical survey of the Anglo-American judicial
system. The preceding installments appeared in the December, 1931, and Febru-
ary, 1932, issues of the CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY. It is expected that the suc-
ceeding parts will appear in subsequent volumes. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the efficient services of his student assistant, Mr. Francis D. Wormuth,
in the preparation of this series of articles.
tProfessor of Law, Cornell Law School.
3Hazeltine, Ecclesiastical Courts, 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(1931) 307; Langdell, The Development of Eguity Pleading from Canon Law Pro-
cedure, 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 754; Stubbs,
The History of the Canon Law in England, I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY (1907) 248; MAITLAND, CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND
(1898) 52, 140; 2 MAITLAND, op. cit. note iI, at 132, Henry II and the Criminous
Clerks; PLUCKNETT. op. cit. note 5, at 216 el seq.; I STUBBS, Op. cit. note 5, at 308; I
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 304 et seg., 582, 587; I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND,
op. cit. note 2, at III et seg.
=In spite of the presence of the bishops in the Anglo-Saxon communal courts,
it is probable that the pre-Conquest church had independent tribunals with ex-
clusive cognizance of some questions pertaining to its spiritual dominion. MA-
KOWER, Felix, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1895)
388; I STUBBS, op. cit. note 5, at 254; BIGELOW, op. cit. note 48, at 29; STUBBS, AP-
PENDIX TO REPORT OF ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS COMMISSION (1883) 23.
3"See note 48, supra. Langdell, op. cit. note 364, at 953-
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Conqueror's ordinance must be treated as the beginning of a new
era.2"?7
The long contested claim of William I and his successors to be the
final appellate authority in the ecclesiastical judicial system, on the
ground that the king was the supreme head of both the temporal and
spiritual jurisdictions in his kingdom, was defeated in 1213 when King
John was compelled to acknowledge the paramount authority of the
pope as head of the English church in all its branches. 6" From that
time to the Reformation the ecclesiastical courts were recognized as
forming within the realm an independent judicial system which
derived its power from a foreign sovereign, the Roman Pope.
69
Whether or not Henry VIII and his Parliament were correct in
their protestations that in becoming the supreme head of the English
church in 1533 he was but resuming the ancient prerogatives of his
"most noble progenitors", Kings of England, to govern all within his
kingdom, spiritual as well as lay,"70 it is clear that henceforth, at least,
the ecclesiastical courts were prerogative courts.37' The ecclesiastical
jurisdiction was thus brought within the royal prerogative of just
tice,27 and the courts spiritual derived their authority solely from the
361 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 453; MAKOWER, op. cit. note
365, at i5, 242; 4 FREEMAN, Edward A., HISTORY OF THE NORMAN CONQUEST OF
ENGLAND (1871) 437, 439.
'SMAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 12-31, 225 et seg.; I SMITH, Goldwin, THE
UNITED KINGDOM (1907) 128; CROSS, op. cit. note 49, at 138; PLUCKNETT, op.
cit. note 5, at 22.
a81 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 581, explains the habit of thought which
accepted such a divided sovereignty without question as based upon the theory
of the survival of the Roman Empire and the Pope as head of a corresponding
universal church. See Langdell, op. cit. note 364, at 766.
37°Henry himself is supposed to have drafted the preamble of the STATUTE OF
APPEALS, 24 HEN. VHI, C. 12 (1533). Professor Holdsworth, I op. cit. note 2, at
591, says of this famous preamble: "But the preamble to this Statute of Appeals is
remarkable, partly because it manufactures history upon an unprecedented
scale, but chiefly because it has operated from that day to this as a powerful in-
centive to its manufacture by others upon similar lines." And see MAITLAND, op.
cit. note 364, at 82.
The report of Caudrey's Case, 5 Coke's Rep. Ia (1591), upholding the STATUTE
OF SUPREMACY, I ELIZ. c. I (x558), as declaratory of the ancient law of England,
contains an appendix marshalling many documents in support of the alleged con-
tinuity of the royal prerogative. And see HALE, JURIsDIcTION OF THE LORD'S
HOUSE OR PARLIAMENT (1669-1676) (Hargrave's ed. 1796) 206.
27 See: I EDW. VI, C. 2 (1547); COKE, op. cit. note 3o , at 6oi; Memorandum of
all the Justices of England, CROXE'S JAC. (4 th ed. 1179) 37 (1605); I HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 592, 597.
372Although Henry VIII was at first acknowledged by the Convocation to be
the supreme head of the English church so far as the law of Christ allowed, and his
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king's grant by letters missive or letters patent,37 3 as declaratory acts
of Parliament repeatedly affirmed.
37 4
All England has been divided from Anglo-Saxon times to the
present into two great ecclesiastical provinces, the province of Canter-
bury and the province of York, each presided over by an archbishop
and possessing its own complete system of spiritual courts.375 The
judicial systems of the two provinces duplicated each other, however,
and therefore they will be treated very much as a single system in this
survey.
Ecclesiastical Courts Before the Reformation
3, 7 6
This ecclesiastical judicial system consisted of the following courts'
named in their order from lowest to highest:
The Archdeacon's Court was the inferior court of the diocese, but
in general it possessed an original jurisdiction practically concurrent
with that of the Consistory. It also exercised supervision over local
Supremacy Acts conferred upon him the title of "only Supreme Head in Earth
of the Church of England", it is clear that he and his successors remained laymen.
They claimed the supreme ecclesiastical administrative authority and juris-
diction (potestas jurisdictionis) but not the power of consecration (potestas
ordinis). Because the title supreme head of the English Church caused mis-
apprehension and hostility, Elizabeth wisely adopted the non-clerical title of
a'supreme governor of this realm in all spiritual as well as in all temporal things."
MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 254 et se.; I HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at
591 et seg.; Maitland, Elizabethan Gleanings-I, 'Defender of the Faith, and so
forth' (19oo) x5 ENG. HisT. Rxv. 120.
373Under 25 HEN. VIII, C. 20, § 4 (1533), upon vacancy of a see, the king ad-
dressed a letter missive to the prior and convent or dean and chapter constituting
the proper electoral body, instructing them to choose a named candidate to the
vacant office; if the electors proved recalcitrant, the king by letter patent to his
nominee directly installed him in office. I EDW. VI, c. 2 (I547) substituted the
practice of direct nomination by letter patent, but 1 ELIZ. c. I (3558) returned
to the earlier method. PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at xxxvi. This practice was in
violation of John's Charter of 3214, promising free elections to bishoprics, which
was confirmed by Magna Carta, clause 48. THoMsoN, Richard, MAGNA CARTA
(3829) 417 et seq.; MAITLAND. op. cit. note 5, at 172.
37425 HEN. VIII, c. 20, § 4 (1533); I EDW. VI, C. 2 (1547); I ELIZ. c. 1 (1558).
375Since the reign of the Conqueror, the Archbishop of Canterbury has been
recognized as primate of England, the highest ecclesiastic of the kingdom. MA-
KOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 281 et seg.
376CoRE, Op. cit. note 7, at 321 et seg.; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 143 et seg.;
3 BLAcKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 6r et seq.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at
580 et seg., which has been republished as The Ecclesiastical Courts and their Juris-
diction, 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (31908) 255; 1
HALE, op. cit. note 278, at I83n.; GODOLPHIN, John, ABRIDGMENT OF ECCLESI-
ASTICAL LAWS (3d ed. z687) 94 et seg.; 2 BURN, Richard, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW
(Phillimore's ed., 1842) 3oe et seq.; STUBBS, op. cit. note 365, at 25 et seg.
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church administration. In the absence of the archdeacon it was
presided over by an "official" appointed by him.
The Consistory Court of the Bishop, or Bishop's Court, was the
general diocesan court, since the bishop, like the archbishop, was a
Judge Ordinary (judex ordinarius), that is, a judge by virtue of his
office. This court had original jurisdiction in all spiritual matters
and appellate jurisdiction over the archidiaconal courts. It was
presided over by the chancellor of the diocese, who in this capacity
acted as the bishop's "official principal" and also, as the bishop's
vicar-general, administered the business affairs of the bishopric.
The Court of the Official Principal, known in the province of
Canterbury as the Court of Arches,37 7 and in the province of York as
the Chancery Court of York, was the chief provincial court of the
archbishop. It possessed a general original jurisdiction in ecclesiasti-
cal matters throughout the province and an appellate jurisdiction
over the Consistory Courts therein. In Canterbury it was presided
over by the Official Principal, or Dean of Arches, and in York by the
Chancellor of that province.
The Court of Peculiars378 was a branch of the Court of Arches
exercising jurisdiction over certain parishes in the province of Canter-
bury, which were subject to the direct authority of the Archbishop
rather than to the local bishop.
There was also an archiepiscopal Court of Audience, 37 9 which was
vested with the personal jurisdiction reserved to the archbishop over
the more important judicial and administrative affairs of the province.
He could remove any cause into this court for trial before himself.
The court became obsolete before the eighteenth century.
3 7 "The court of arches is a court... whereof the judge is called the dean of the
arches, because he anciently held his court in the church of Saint Mary le bow,
(sancta Maria de arcubus) though all the principal spiritual courts are now holden
at doctors' commons." 3 BLACKSTONE, op. Cit. note 23, at 64-65.
After the foundation of Doctors' Commons, the Court of Arches, the Pre-
rogative Court of Canterbury, the Court of the Bishop of London, and the Court
of Admiralty sat in the Common Hall of that institution. FOSTER, G. J., DOCTORS'
Com o s (1871) 6. See note 49o, infra.
378A "peculiar" was a parish or church exempt from the ordinary territorial
jurisdiction and subject to a bishop of another diocese, or to an abbot, dean or
other ecclesiastic head. I HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 6oo. Usually each
peculiar had its Peculiar Court, but the peculiars directly subject to the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury were under the jurisdiction of his Court of Peculiars at
London. The Peculiar Courts were practically abolished by io and Ii VicT. c. 98
(1847), but the Court of Peculiars still survives. STUBBS, op. Cit. note 365, at 31.
37See especially LEADAM, op. cit. note 249, at lxxxv et seg.; STUBBS, 0c. Cit.
note 378.
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The Prerogative Court was the great archiepiscopal court of pro-
bate and possessed jurisdiction over all testamentary matters where
the deceased left bona notabilia (goods of a certain value)8 0 in more
than one diocese of the province. Although this court was commonly
referred to as the Ordinary's Court, it was normally presided over by
the Official Principal or by a judge called a "Commissary" specially
commissioned by the Ordinary of the Province, that is, the arch-
bishop. To this day some of the states which made up the thirteen
original colonies have a Prerogative Court or Court of Ordinary and
Probate presided over by a judge called the "Ordinary".
381
Process issued in the name of the archbishop in the provincial
courts and in the name of the bishop in the diocesan courts, rather
than in the king's name, except for a short time in the reign of
Edward VI.In
The Roman Curia,3  that is, the pope, was the highest of the pre-
Reformation ecclesiastical courts. It possessed both original and
final appellate jurisdiction over all Christendom with power to remove
a cause to itself from any inferior court at any stage of the proceed-
ings. In most instances the case would then be sent to be tried by
papal commissaries in the country in which it originated. From the
fourteenth century, the papal jurisdiction over civil appeals was
vested in a new court called the Rota Romana, an international body
of twelve prelates.31a It was against this foreign assertion of supreme
aS0GODOLPEIN, op. cit. note 376, at i04, states that to give the Prerogative
Court of Canterbury jurisdiction, the bona notabilia must amount to the value of
X5, save in the diocese of London, where it was XiO.
3nn Georgia there is in each county a Court of Ordinary and Probate, over
which an Ordinary presides. GEORGIA CONSTITUTION (1877) ARTICLE 6, § 6.
New Jersey has a Prerogative Court held by an Ordinary or Surrogate General.
N-w JERSEY CONSTITUTION (1844) ARTICLE 6, §§ 1,4.
392i EDw. VI, C. 2 (I547), repealed by I ELIZ. C. I (1558) and 8 ELIZ. c. I (1565),
according to 5 PicKERNG, op. cit. note 170, at 245. PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169,
at xxxvii n., states that the statute of Edward was repealed by Mary. See I
HOLDsWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 593.
3 83MAX TAND, op. cit. note 364, at IO3, 127; I HOLDSWORTH, Op. it. note 2, at
583 et seg.; CARTER, Op. cit. note 68, at 145. For an interesting account of an
appeal to Rome and its argument before the Pope, see Hall, Hubert, The Methods
of the Royal Courts of .ustie in the Fifteenth Century, 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AmEicAN LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 434 et seq.
SSaThe membership of the Rota was drawn from Rome, Spain, France, Ger-
many, and certain Italian cities and provinces. The court declined in importance
after the sixteenth century, but in 19o8 was restored as a supreme court of appea
in civil and criminal matters. It has ten judges, but usually only three sit. 3
WiGMoRE, John Henry, PANoRAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYsTRms (1928) 935
et seq.; ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (izth ed., igii) titles Curia, Rota.
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jurisdiction that the English crown fought. Though defeated in the
original contest, the crown with the aid of Parliament continued the
struggle, and in the ensuing centuries by a series of great statutes, of
which the most notable were the famous Praemunire Acts,;4 the
right of appeal to Rome was much curtailed.38
Ecclesiastical Courts After the Reformationi
The Reformation did not affect the general structure of the eccle-
siastical courts of England. Its chief consequence was to substitute
a new supreme appellate tribunal in the place of the Roman Curia.
The High Court of Delegates,8" instituted by Henry VIII in x534,
succeeded to the final appellate jurisdiction of the pope over the
English ecclesiastical courts. The Act of 25 Henry VIII, c. ig, § 6
(1533) provided for appeal from archiepiscopal courts to the King in
Chancery, and for the issuance, of a commission of appeal out of
Chancery under the Great Seal, appointing certain persons to hear
the appeal as delegates of the king, supreme head of the church of
England. This procedure was no innovation but was simply an
extension of the appellate procedure in admiralty causes into the
ecclesiastical system. Since a separate commission issued for each
appeal, there might be several distinct tribunals of this character in
session at the same time, some sitting on admiralty appeals and some
on spiritual appeals, but so constantly did they sit that they came to
be "termed collectively 'The High Court of Delegates in Ecclesiasti-
cal and Maritime Causes.' ",388 Although the statute made final the
judgment of the delegates, it was later held that the king, like the
pope, possessed the power to issue a Commission of Review for a com-
plete rehearing of the case by a newly appointed body. Such review,
being an exercise of the royal prerogative of grace, could not be
demanded as of right by the subject, nor was there any limit to the
3"The STATUTES OF PRAEMUNIRE, 27 EDW. III, St. 1, c. I (1353), and x6
RICHARD II, c. 5 (1392-3), severely penalized resort to Rome in derogation of the
jurisdiction of the common law courts. I REPORT OF ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS
ComMIssION (1883) 2dx.
3MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 38 et seg.; I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. Cit.
note 2, at 125 et seq.; BIGELOW, op. cit. note 48, at 40 et seg.; I HOLDSWORTH, op.
cit. note 2, at 584, et seg.
38See note 376, supra. See also 2 CHITTY, op. cit. note 236, at 495 et seq.;
STUBBS, op. cit. note 365, at 32 et seq.
3 7 PRoTHERo, op. cit. note 169, at xxxviii; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 66;
i HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 603 et seg.; MArOWER, op. cit. note 365, at
457 et seg.; COKE, OP. cit. note 7, at 339; STUBBs, op. cit. note 365, at 46 et seg.
388MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 457.
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number of times it could be exercised in a case. 8 9 Thus was revived
what had been one of the most objectionable features of the papal
jurisdiction. As was to be expected, this court was abolished by Mary
but was re6stablished under Elizabeth, and, though quite oyer-
shadowed during the hey-day of the High Commission, it survived
until 1832 when by statute its jurisdiction was vested in the Privy
Council.390
The court with paramount authority over ecclesiastical offenses in
the post-Reformation period was an inquisitorial branch of the
Council called the High Commission,3 91 established by Elizabeth
(i558-i6o3) in the exercise of the royal prerogative, and under the
broad, concurring provisions of the great Act of Supremacy39 2 of the
first year of her reign. It was organized by a general commission
under the royal letters patent directed to the Archbishop of Canter-
bury and certain other prelates, privy councillors and doctors of the
civil law. The membership varied under the different commissions
from seventeen to over a hundred, but eventually a quorum was fixed
at three, of whom at least one must be of a certain group of the com-
missioners.3 n The jurisdiction conferred by these commissions did
not always extend throughout the realm. A separate commission
sometimes issued for each province, or occasionally for a single
diocese, but the policy of having very few commissions outstanding
and of appointing the members from substantially the same group of
prelates, officials and civilians led to such an essential continuity of
personnel that the several bodies soon acquired the status of branches
of an established court.3"
This august tribunal was empowered to enforce by fine and im-
prisonment the Acts of Supremacy and of Uniformity, and other
statutes, ordinances and proclamations establishing the Church of
England, to discipline the clergy and to exercise a supervision over
and a jurisdiction concurrent with the courts spiritual. Like the
38
9MAXOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 457; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 67; 1
HoLDswORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 603, 604; GODOLPEIN, op. cit. note 376, at 118.
COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 340, discusses this commission under the title, "The
Court of the Commissioners of Review."
3901 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 605; MAKOWEn, op. cit. note 365, at 458.
3"CoKE, op. cit. note 7, at 324 et seg.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 605;
MAITLAND, op. Cit. note 5, at 264 et seg.; MAKOWER, op. cit, note 365, at 261 et
seg.; PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at xl et seg.; Stubbs, op. cit. note 364, at 279;
STUBBS, op. cit. note 365, at 49 el seg.
39I ELIZ. c. I, § z8 (1558).
39 PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at xli.
39"MAROWER, op. cit. note 365, at 263; PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at xlv; I
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 607.
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Roman Curia it could remove to itself any cause within its cognizance
from inferior spiritual or temporal courts at any stage of the proceed-
ings.
The High Commission was the ecclesiastical Star Chamber, both
in its relation to the Council and to the other courts of the realm.
It, too, administered an efficient but arbitrary justice in causes great
and small, from which there was no appeal.39 s Deservedly popular
while it served the purpose for which it was founded, its commonly
exercised right to arrest on suspicion, its practice of cross-examination
of the defendant on "ex officio" oath, and its excessive fines and reck-
less sentences to long term and life imprisonment brought upon it
the same public opprobrium incurred by its great secular counter-
part. It vigorously resisted the attempts of the common law courts
and Chancery to keep it within its proper sphere by writs of prohibi-
tion and even by writs of habeas corpus releasing prisoners whose
legal and equitable rights it had ruthlessly invaded.398
The Long Parliament abolished the High Commission by a distinct
statute39 7 at the same time that the Star Chamber and its satellites
fell. It was not revived by the general act reestablishing the church
courts at the Restoration, 398 but in 1686 James II created a Court of
Ecclesiastical Commission, using the seal and performing the func-
tions of the old High Commission. The later Commission was
abolished in 1688 and the great Bill of Rights of 1689 expressly
proscribed such tribunals in the future.399
The Jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts
The ecclesiastical courts possessed a spiritual and a temporal
jurisdiction in matters both civil and criminal. The Conqueror's
ordinance providing that causes arising under the episcopal laws
should be tried in the bishop's court and making available the coer-
cive sanction of the state to enforce its judgments, did not purport
a"As to the scope of its jurisdiction see I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 6o9;
PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at x1iii. That there was no appeal of right but
merely a supplication to the crown for a commission of review, see COKE, op. cit.
note 7, at 341; PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at xliii, xliv; MAKOWER, op. Cit. note
365, at 458n; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 6W8,
39See note 142, supra, and 2 CoxE, op. cit. note 30, at 6o9; CARTER, op. cit. note
41, at 89 et seg.; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 1I2; MAITLAND, Op. cit.
note 364, at 107.
3916 CAR. I, c. IX (1641); I CLARENDON, op. cit. note 333, at 372; I HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 606.
3981 3 CAR. II, St. I, c. 12 (1661).
3
KTEREvELYAN, op. cit. note ii9, at 470; MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 264.
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to define the respective spheres of the lay and spiritual jurisdictions. 410
That was destined to be the work of the historic struggle between
church and state which almost immediately followed.
The spiritual jurisdiction of the church extended to two classes of
cases. The first dealt with enforcement of discipline within the church
and religious orders. It covered matters both civil and criminal, as
for example, suits between churchmen relating to church lands, debts
between members of the clergy and such clerical offenses as heresy,
simony and the like.40 ' But a far-reaching exception to this general
jurisdiction over church property and church lands was established
when the doughty Henry II succeeded in settling the English law that
an advowson (the right to present a clergyman to a living) Was
temporal property and, therefore, beyond the reach of ecclesiastical
laws or courts aside from the right of the bishop to pass upon the fit-
ness of the presentee.4 2 The second class related to spiritual offenses
committed by laymen, such as heresy, schism, sacrilege, non-con-
formity, failure to observe the ordinances of the church, to attend
services or to pay first fruits and tithes.413 It was the latter class which
fell primarily within the terms of the Conqueror's ordinance.
The temporal jurisdiction of the Courts Christian appears to
have consisted in part of that administered in the Anglo-Saxon
communal courts, in part of Norman innovations, but chiefly of that
wrested from the crown prior to the fourteenth century.4 4 This
temporal jurisdiction was divided into two branches, one criminal
' 0MANOWER, oP. cit. note 365, at 242; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 587;
BIGELOW, op. cit. note 48, at 31.
401M.AxowR, op. cit. note 365, at 389 et seg., 418, 434; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit.
note 2, at 619; BIGELOW, op. cit. note 48, at 36 el seg.; STUBBS, op. cit. note 365, at
28 e seg.
40'CONSTITUTIONS OF CLAPENDON (1164) clause r, which is translated in POUND
AND PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 6, at 72: "If a controversy concerning advowson and
presentation to churches arise between laymen, or between laymen and clerks, or
between clerks, it shall be treated of and terminated in the couit of the lord
king." MAITLAND, op. cit. note 364, at 63, observes, "As Henry did not admit
that this was an innovatioh it did not fall within the [his] renunciation of Av-
ranches" (1172). On the same page he hails this victory as "the true Magna
Carta of the 'liberties of the English Church."' He adds, "This is the foundation
of all subsequent legislation against provisors," i. e., attempts of the papacy to
control presentation to the English church. If a bishopric or see became vacant,
the king had the right of presentation. And see: GLANVILLE, A TREATISE ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND (C. 1181) (BeaMes' ed. 1900)
69 et seg.; MAowEl, op. cit. note 365, at 434.
4
03MAXOWFR, op. cit. note 365, at 417 et seg.; MAITLAND, oP. cit. note 364, at
78; 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 616 et seq.; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op.
cit. note 2, at 546 et seq.; STUBBS, 10C. cit. note 4oi.
4
14MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 392 el seg.; BIGELOW, op. cit. note 48, at 30 et sea.
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and corrective, the other civil. One of the most important aspects of
the criminal jurisdiction was its competence in respect to "criminous
clerks". In the thirteenth century the "benefit of clergy" (privilegium
cleri) had become firmly established. By this plea any cleric accused
of felony other than treason and which was punishable by death or
mutilation, was entitled, if a first offender, to trial and punishment in
the bishop's court and according to the episcopal law 5 since that did
not inflict these extreme penalties.416 At first the church, but later
the secular judge, determined whether the defendant who pleaded
benefit of clergy was a cleric,407 or was a person within the wide group
to which that definition was at one time extended, namely, any one
who could read a verse in the Bible. Pretending to read a memorized
"neck-verse" in Latin soon grew to be a serious venture of defense.
4 8
Beginning with Henry VII the privilege of clergy was gradually
curtailed by statute.40 9 In the reign of Elizabeth it ceased to be a
ground for removal of a case to the ecclesiastical forum, and there-
after survived, though on an ever decreasing scale, simply in mitiga-
tion of sentence10 until finally abolished by statute in 1827.4U
45Baker, Newman F., Benefit of Clergy-A Legal Anomaly (1927) 15 Ky. L. J.
85; Stenton, Mrs. Doris M., England: Henry II, 6 CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HIS-
TORY (1926) 554, 560; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 615; 3 ibid. 293 et seg.;
MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 403 et se.; 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 365
et seg.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 364, at 132 et Se.; COKE, op. cit. note 30, at 633 et
se.; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at I7; I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2,
at 441 et seq. Benefit of clergy was extended to America for a time. See Baker,
op. cit. supra, at III et seq.
The Act of 4 HENRY VII, c. 13 (1489) introduced a practice of branding on the
thumb one who was convicted after pleading benefit of clergy, with "M" for
murder and "T" for other crime as a means of assuring his discovery as a second
offender. Later statutes required corroborative proof of such previous con-
viction. 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 367; MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at
415, 447; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 230; 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 299.
40See notes 43r, 432 and 433, infra.
4072 HALE, op. cit. note 342, at 372, 379 et seq. Cf. MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365,
at 403. If the ordinary returned non legit (he does not read), and the accused
felon later learned to read, the secular court might grant him benefit of clergy,
even though sentence of death had been passed upon him. But the jailer who
taught an accused to read was punished. 2 HALE, op. cit. note 342, at 379.
4081 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 445; 3 HOLDSWORTII, op. Cit.
note 2, at 298 et seq.; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 17, says the "neck-verse"
was from the Psalms. CARTER, op. cit. note 41, at 247n, cites the verse as Psalm
LI, v. I. The reading privilege was abolished by the Act of 5 ANNE c. 6 (1705).
403 HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 299 et seg.; MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at
414 et seq.; PROTHERO, op. cit. note 169, at xxxviu.
410MAKoWER, op. cit. note 365, at 449 et se.; 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23,
at 367.
4117 & 8 GEo. IV, c. 28 (1827) declared benefit of clergy finally abolished, and 4 &
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The corrective temporal jurisdiction dealt with those misdeeds of
cleric or layman peculiarly related to morals and religion, such as
sexual offenses, bigamy, perjury, witchcraft and disorders affecting
the church and churchmen. 4 2 By a series of statutes beginning in the
reign of Henry VIII and culminating in the first quarter of the nine-
teenth century, most of these offenses were made punishable as crimes
and misdemeanors in the secular courts. In consequence the church's
criminal and corrective jurisdiction fell into disuse.413 While techni-
cally the spiritual courts in England still retain a remnant of their old
jurisdiction with respect to certain offenses, in practice they exer-
cise it only in cases involving the clergy.
414
Throughout practically the whole of the Westminster epoch .the
temporal civil jurisdiction of the church courts dealt principally with
matrimonial causes, testamentary matters and cases of defamation.41 5
5 VIcT. c. 22 (1841) insured that this abolition applied to peers, who had been
given the privilege by I EDW. VI, C. 12, § 15 (1547).
423 STUBBS, op. cit. note 5, at 357 et seg.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 616
et seq.; MAKOWER, op. cit. note 364, at 439 et seg.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at
523; BIGELOW, op. cit. note 48, at 5o; 2 PoLLocK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2,
at 543 et seg.
4 1
3MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 453 ef seq.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2 at 620.
The act abolishing the High Commission (x6 CAR. I, c. II, x641) also abolished
the criminal and corrective jurisdiction of the general ecclesiastical courts, and
in the same year was passed "An act for disenabling all persons in holy orders to
exercise any temporal jurisdiction or authority", i6 CAR. I, c. 27. During the
Commonwealth the offices of the church were filled with Puritan sectarians and
the power as well as much of the organization of the church disappeared. On the
restoration of Charles II, the basic judicial system of the church was restored
intact by the repealing statutes of 13 CAR. II, c. 2 (1661) and 13 CAR. II, c. 12
(i66i). MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 522. Cf. I HOLDSWORT, supra, at 61i,62o.
4 14MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 455; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 620;
MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 524.
5 BIGELOW, op. cit. note 48, at 51; 3 HOLDSWORTR, op. cit. note 2, at 410 et seg.;
MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 439. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over defamation
was taken away by 18 & 19 VIcT. c. 41 (1855).
Bishop Stubbs vividly compares the jurisdictions of state and church, The
History of the Canon Law in England, op. cit. note 364, at 271: "Now the common
law of the land was quite competent to deal first with ecclesiastical property,
temporalities, advowsons, and the right to tithes; the canon law dealt with the
qualifications of presentees and the exaction of tithes: the common law was
competent to deal with matters of debt or theft; the canon law claimed to deal
with matters of credit or dishonesty in legal and moral as in spiritual obligations:
the common law dealt with dower, the canon law with matrimony; the common
law with succession to property, the canon law with legitimacy. So over great
regions of property law, and over the whole domain of moral delinquency, the
medieval world had two sets of courts at which they might sue, and two sets of
lawyers to keep alive with fees and retainers."
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The early attempt of the canonists to withdraw from the temporal
courts all cases of breach of faith (fdei laesio) even though involving a
debt situation or a formal contract cognizable at common law,416 was
checked by Henry II in the memorable Constitutions of Clarendon
(1164) .417".
Both the Writ Circumspecte Agatis (1286)418 which redefined the
domains of spiritual and temporal justice, and the general practice
thereafter, confirm the view that the spiritual courts' jurisdiction
over breach of promises supported by oath or pledge of faith was not
interfered with in cases where the secular procedure afforded no
remedy.u 9 The historical fact that the common law action of case
sur assumpsit only began to take over the field of breach of promises
as the sanctions of the church weakened in the late fourteenth and
4"1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 128 et seg.; 2 ibid. 197 et seq.;
Hazeltine, Harold D., The Formal Contract of Early English Law (igio) IO COL. L.
REv. 6o8, 616, reprinted in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(ig3i) I, 9; Pollock, Contracts in Early English Law (1893) 6 HARv. L. REv.
389, 390, 395 et seg., 4o3, reprinted in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS (1931) 10, 12, 15 et seq., 21; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 16, 220; Ames,
Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit (1894) 8 HARV. L. REv. 252, 254, reprinted in
SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 23, 25.
'17By the fifteenth clause, which read: "Pleas concerning debts shall be in the
jurisdiction of the king, irrespective of whether they were accompanied by a
pledge of faith or not." POUND AND PLucNETT, op. cit. note 6, at 72-75; MA-
ROWER, op. cit. note 365, at 467-469. This clause is discussed in PLUCKNETT,
loc. cit. note 416; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 198.
418Graves, E. B., Circumspecte Agatis (1928) 43 ENG. HiST. REV. I, at 8, says,
"The evidence clearly shows that Circumspecte Agatis was issued [by Edward I]
from Paris to the itinerant justices of Norfolk in June or July 1286," and not in
1285, as stated in the Statutes of the Realm.
This line of cleavage was confirmed in the next reign by the statute ARTIcuLI
CLERI, 9 EDWARD II (1307-1326), St. I (1316), which is described by MAKOWER,
op. cit. note 365, at 39, as containing "a demarcation of the competence of secular
and ecclesiastical courts, couched almost in the terms of the circumspecte agatis,
... ; beside this, it redresses a number of insignificant church grievances, without,
however, sacrificing essential prerogatives of the state."
"93 STUBBS, op. cit. note 5, at 357n., says: "Notwithstanding the 15th con-
stitution of Clarendon, cases of debt, as cases 'laesionis fidei,' were long tried in
court Christian; the Acts of the Ripon Chapter for 1452-I5o6 contain ix8 such
cases." Accord: Pollock, op. cit. note 416, (1893) 6 HARv. L. REv. 403, SELECTED
READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 21; I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op.
cit. note 2, at 128 el seg.; MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 434, 444. Cf. Ames,
loc. cit. note 416; PLUCKNETT, loc. cit. note 416.
The STATUTE OF THE WRIT OF CONSULTATION (18 EDWARD I, 1290) expressly
provided that the ecclesiastical judges should proceed with a case in spite of a
writ of prohibition from the King's Courts if there was no writ to afford a remedy
at law. 6 HALSBURY, Op. cit. note 17o, at 161.
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early fifteenth centuries would seem to cast a significant light upon
the inter-relation of these two'judicial system§ in the field of contract
up to that time. With the perfection of the action of special assumpsit
and the development of the chancery remedy of specific performance,
the ecclesiastical forum was finally compelled to surrender all its
jurisdiction over broken promises&a0
The most common matrimonial causes were those relating to mar-
riage, divorce and legitimacy. The ecclesiastical courts could declare
a marriage a nullity ab initio (from the beginning),4' but if there were
a valid marriage, they could grant only a divorce a mensa et thoro
(from table and bed), that is, a legal separation.4 In the latter case, a
divorce a vinculo matrimonii (from the bond of marriage) or absolute
divorce could only be obtained by a private act of Parliament,4 and
0The development of the contract actions is recounted in AMES, op. cit. note 4,
Lectures 12, r3, 14; Ames, op. cit. note 416; Ames, The History of Assumpsit (1888)
2 HAiv. L. REv. 1, 53, reprinted in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AmERICA LEGAL
HISTORY (1909) 259, and in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1931) 33; 2 STREET, op. cit. note 195, at I et seg.
42This is termed an annulment of marriage under modern divorce procedure.
Although called a divorce a vinculo inatrimonii by the ecclesiastical courts, that
was a misnomer since those courts granted this relief solely on the theory that
there was never a valid marriage. MACQUEEN, John, APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS AN P~rvY CoUNCm (x842) 466n.
42I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 394; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit.
note 2, at 623; Bryce, James, Marriage and Divorce under Roman and English Law,
3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1909) 823.
1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 623; Bryce, op. cit. note 422, at 824. The
expense of such proceedings made legal divorce and remarriage impossible for
the poor. Mr. Justice Maule, in imposing sentence for bigamy upon a poor man
for remarrying several years after his first wife had deserted him, ironically re-
marked: "Prisoner, you have been convicted upon the clearest evidence of the
crime of intermarrying with another woman, your lawful wife being still alive.
You say your first wife left her home and young children to live in adultery with
another man, and that this prosecution is an instrument of persecution and ex-
tortion on the part of the adulterer. Be it so. I am bound to tell you, however,
that these facts form no defence. Every Englishman is bound to know that there
is a remedy for every wrong, and I will tell you what you ought to have done.
You should, on hearing of your wife's adultery, have commenced an action
against the seducer, and obtained counsel and witnesses, so as to get substantial
damages against the adulterer. You should then have employed a proctor and
counsel in another suit in the Ecclesiastical Courts, so as to get a divorce a mensa
et thoro. You should next have obtained a private Act-of Parliament to dissolve
your marriage. You might say that these proceedings would cost £i,ooo, and
that you were not worth £roo, or £ro. It may be so. The law has, however,
nothing to do with that. If you had taken the right course you would have
escaped the serious" crime of marrying another woman. The sentence of the court
which I have to pronounce for this misconduct is, that you be imprisoned for one
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then only after an ecclesiastical divorce followed by recovery of
damages from the adulterer in an action at common law for criminal
conversation. 42
Maitland has pointed out that in England "the canonists...
acquired what they hardly aspired to elsewhere: namely, an exclusive
jurisdiction over testamentary causes and over the distribution of the
goods of intestates." 4 5 This included the probate of wills and the
administration and distribution of decedents' personal estates.
The real estate of a decedent passed to his heir according to the feudal
principles of the common law.47 Chancery early began to infringe
day." JAMES, Croake, CURIOSITIES OF LAW AND LAWYERS (883) 317. For
prohibitions in state constitutions against legislative divorce, see McCuIRY,
William E., CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (Ist ed. 1927) 316n.
4uNow in a majority of American jurisdictions, contrary to the older common
law rule, a married woman may maintain an action for criminal conversation
against the adulteress. Turner v. Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S. W.23,4 A. L. R.
562 (1918); Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 891, 4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 643
(1906); Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. 156, 14o N. E. 227,28 A. L. R. 320 (1923).
See CARDOZO, op. cit. note 175, at IO5.
4MAITLAND, op. cit. note 364, at 59. The power to bequeath personal property
was established in England prior to the Conquest. The ecclesiastical tribunals,
upon their separation from the ancient communal courts, gradually took over the
jurisdiction, formerly exercised only by the king, to supervise the distribution of
chattels according to testament. I PAGE, William Herbert, THE LAW OF WILLS
(1926) 7 et seg.; REPPY AND TOMPKINS, HISTORY OF WILLS (1928) 5 el Seg., 90 et
seq.; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 314 ef seq.; I HOLDSWORTH, op.
cit. note 2, at 625; LANGDELL, op. cit. note 17o , at 128; I BRADFORD'S SuaRo-
GATE'S COURT REP. (N. Y. I85i) vii.
In Saxon days the next of kin of an intestate shared his property. It may be
true, as some contend, that after the Conquest feudal custom permitted the lord
to seize the chattels of an intestate vassal. MAGNA CARTA (1215) provided that
the Church should supervise distribution of such chattels among the next of
kin. The corrupt practices resulting led to a provision in the STATUTE OF WEST-
MINSTER II (1285), compelling the ordinary to pay the debts of the deceased, and
31 EDW. III, St. I, c. 11 (1357), provided that the ordinary should appoint ad-
ministrators from among the friends of the deceased. Later statutes regulated
the duties of the administrator. I HOLDSwoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 626 et seg.;
REPPY AND TOMPKINS, op. cit. supra, at 114 et seg.; 2 POLLoCK AND MAITLAND,
op. cit. note 2, at 356 et seq.; Gross, Charles, The Mediaeval Law of Intestacy, 3
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (19o9) 723.
4261 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 627 et seg.; MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at
425 et se.; LANGDELL, op. cit. note 170, at 128 et seq.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5,
at 508; 6 SELDEN, WORKS (ed. 1728) 1664, Of the Original of the Ecclesiastical
Jurisdiction of Testaments.
evThere are instances of devises of real property in Anglo-Saxon days. How-
ever, the establishment of feudal land tenure introduced the rule of primogeniture
which prevented any interference with such succession, except where borough
customs survived or in cases of estates for years or other interests less than free-
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upon this field, however, and by the eighteenth century had in prac-
tice taken over all of it except the actual probate of wills and the
grant of letters of administration.4
8
This ancient ecclesiastical jurisdiction over matrimonial causes
and testamentary matters continued until 1857 when it was vested in
two new secular courts-one the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes, and the other, the Court of Probate.49 The Judicature Acts
merged both courts, together with the Court of Admiralty, into the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of
Justice.4
0
In 1874 it was provided that the two archbishops should nominate
a single judge of the Provincial Courts of Canterbury and York,
subject to approval by the crown, instead of each appointing a sep-
arate judge for his own province as formerly. However, when sitting
in either province he sits as the judge of the old provincial court of
hold which could be devised as "chattels real." The equitable "use", first em-
ployed early in the fourteenth century, permitted the devise of the equitable title
to land and thus undermined the whole feudal structure. The STATUTE OF USES,
27 HEN. VIII, C. 10 (1535), had the apparent effect of preventing such devises,
and was thus one of the provocations leading to the rebellion known as the Pil-
grimage of Grace. The STATUTE OF WILLS, 32 HEN. VIII, c. I (154o), permitted
free devise of land held in socage tenure (a tenure free of military service), and
devise of two-thirds of the land held by knight service. In 166o, by I2 CAR. II, c.
24, the feudal system was abolished, and knight service transformed into socage
tenure: thenceforth devise of real property was free. Although a will disposing
of both personalty and realty was probated in the ecclesiastical court, its validity
with respect to the real estate could be tested by action of ejectment in a common
law court. DIGEY, Kenelin Edward, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
(1876) 342 el seq.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 143, at 34 et seg.; 3 HOLDSWORTH, Op.
cit. note 2, at 22 et seq.; REPPY AND TOMPKINS, op. cit. note 425, at 12 et seg., 67 et
seq., 113; I PAGE, op. cit. note 425, at 13 et seq.; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op.
cit. note 2, at 329 et seq. The absurdity of the right of two distinct courts to pass
upon the validity of the same will was pointed out by Lord Chancellor Hard-
wicke in Montgomery v. Clark, 2 Atkyns' Chan. Rep. 378, 26 Eng. Reprint 628
(x742), but the anomaly continued until the COURT OF PROBATE ACT of 1857.
REPPY & TOMPKINS, op. cit. supra, 113 et seq.
4S1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 629; 5 ibid. 288; LANGDELL, op. Cit. note
17o, at z55 et seg.
4
292o & 21 VICT. c. 77 (1857) transferred the testamentary jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts to the Court of Probate; 20 & 21 VIcT. C. 85 (1857) trans-
ferred their matrimonial jurisdiction to the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes- MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 451; 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at
624, 630. Cf. INDERWICK, op. cit. note 121, at 219. The Court of Probate, the
Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, and the Court of Admiralty were
consolidated into the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the Supreme
Court of Judicature, by the JUDICATURE AcT of 1873, 36 & 37 VICT. c. 66, § 31.
U03 6 & 37 VICT. c. 66, § 31 (1873).
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that province-the Court of Arches of Canterbury or the Chancery
Court of York, as the case may be. It is significant of the position of
the ecclesiastical courts at the close of the Westminster epoch that
this judge must be a barrister at law of ten years standing or a
former judge of a superior court of law or equity."
The Sanctions of the Ecclesiastical Courts
In theory, the sanctions of the ecclesiastical courts were spiritual-
the more serious of its censures being penance, deprivation of a living,
degradation and, finally, excommunication.432 Penance might
include immuration (imprisonment) for life4 and such restrictions
as to food and clothing as might well weaken and destroy any but one
of iron constitution.431 If the commands and decrees of the church
proved unavailing against an excommunicated person for forty days,
the sanction of the temporal courts could be called in by the writ
de excommunicato capkndo issued out of Chancery, which directed
his arrest and imprisonment until he atoned according to the clerical
sentence.415 The old extreme censure of excommunication was to
ecclesiastical law what outlawry was to the common law-it involved
loss of legal protection, forfeiture of goods and other severe disabili-
ties.4"' By statute in 1813, these disabling penalties of excom-
4"PULIC WORSHIP REGULATION ACT, 37 & 38 Vicr. c. 85 (1874). Some
writers have mistaken the appointment of a single judge for the two courts for a
merger of the courts. MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 46o.
4MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 437 et seq.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at
63o et seq.; BIGELOW, op. cit. note 48, at 70 el seq.; I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op.
cit. note 2, at 444; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 364, at 166 et seq.; 2 MAITLAND, op. Cit.
note ixi, at 395 et seg., 405, The Deacon and the Jewess.
4"-MAKowER, op. cit. note 365, at 191; 3 STUBBS, op. cit. note 5, at 359. The
bishops possessed their own prisons: 3 STUBBS, lc. cit. supra; 3 HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. note 2, at 299; MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 187; COKE, THIRD INSTI-
TUTES (Hargrave's ed. 1797) 39.
4"For instance, the Laws of Henry I provide: "If a priest or monk slay a man,
let him lose his orders and repent for ten years, six on bread and water, and for
four years let him fast three days in a week, and the rest of the time eat his own
food. If a priest wound a man, let him fast for one hundred days." BIGELOW,
op. cit. note 48, at 71.
4 "LANGDELL, op. cit. note 170, at 26; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 630;
MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 242n.; COKE, op. cit. note 30, at 630 et seq. The
STATUTE OF THE WRIT DE EXCOmmUNICATO CAPIENDO, 5 LIZ. C. 23 (1563),
for the better execution of that writ, recites the loss of respect for ecclesiastical
censures following the Reformation. And see STUBBS, op. cit. note 364, at 277.
4nHazeltine, Excommunication, 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(1931) 671, 677; 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 631; 2 BACON, Matthew,
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW (Gwillim's ed. 1807) 674 e seg.
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munication were abolished and the ecclesiastical court was em-
powered to impose with a sentence of excommunication a penalty of
not exceeding six months imprisonment.417 The Act did away with
excommunication as a penalty for disobedience to the orders of the
ecclesiastical courts, although not for other offenses, and substituted
therefor arrest for contempt under a new statutory writ de contumace
capiendo."8 Since the church could give no judgment incurring the
shedding of blood, the ecclesiastical forum, after it had tried and
convicted a heretic, turned him over to the temporal authorities.
Thereupon, as provided by the Act of 2 Henry IV (1399-1413),419 a
writ de haerelico comburendo (concerning the burning of a heretic) was
issued to the sheriff, who proceeded to inflict the penalty of the canon
law that heresy should be punished with death by burning.4 0 After
the reformation, practically all prosecution for heresy was required to
be by indictment in the temporal courts before the accused was
handed over to the ecclesiastical courts for trial."' By Act of 29
Charles II, c. 9 (1677), all capital punishment as a result of ecclesiasti-
cal censures was abolished.
THE MARiTimE COURTS
The maritime courts administered a cosmopolitan or international
law of the sea known as the maritime law, which was a branch of the
Law Merchant and more nearly related to the civil law of the conti-
nent than to the English common law."' This law, still applied in
37I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 631, 632; I MAKOWER, op. ct. note 365, at
456; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 524. 4853 GEo. III, c. 127 (I813).
439 The statute of 2 HEN. IV, c. 15 (14oo) instructed the local authorities to burn
those whom the ordinary had declared guilty of heresy, without the need for
royal writ. 2 HEN. V, c. 7 (414) provided for indictment of heretics in the
King's Bench, assizes, and quarter sessions, and trial of the accused by the ordi-
nary. The act of Henry IV was repealed by 25 HEN. VIII, c. 14 (1533), was revived
by Mary in 1554, and again repealed by Elizabeth in 1558. In the reigns of Ed-
ward VI, Elizabeth and James I, however, many heretics, having been condemned
by the High Commission or by a bishop's court, were put to death by the royal
writ, de haeretico comburendo. The use of the writ without statutory authority was
probably illegal. 2 STEPHEN, Sir James Fitzjames, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 446 et seg.; Coke's opinion in 12 Coke's Rep. 93 (1612).
Contra: 2 BuRN, op. cit. note 376, at 305 et seg.; I Hale, op. cit. note 342, at 4o5;
i HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 617. The last burning of heretics in England
was in 1612, over Coke's dissent.
"OMAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 522, 524; I HoLDswORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 616
et seq.; MAKOWER, op. cit. note 365, at 183, 190.
44I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 617; MAKOWER, op. Cit. note 365, at I90.
"2Scrutton, Roman Law Influences, I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY (1907) 208, 230; r HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 526 et seq.; 5
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admiralty causes in both England and America, 4 4 is chiefly based on
two codes: " (i) The Laws of Oleron,45 codification of which is at-
tributed to Queen Eleanor of Guienne (1122-i2o4), a  the consort of
Henry II, and mother of Richard Coeur de Lion. This code became
the law of the NorthSea and the Atlantic Ocean. (2) The Consolato
del Mare,44 7 a body of Mediterranean customs codified at Barcelona,
Spain, which had a wide influence because of the predominance of the
Mediterranean cities in the commerce of the middle ages. Much of
these two codes was copied into the Black Book of the Admiralty, an
ibid. 12o et seg!; Mears, Thomas Lambert, History of the Admiralty Jurisdiction,
2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (Igo8) 321 et Seq.
443 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 559; WOODRUFF, Edwin H., INTRODUC-
TION TO THE STUDY OF LAW (1898) 73; 3 KENT, Chancellor James, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW (i4th ed. 1896) 13n. cites American cases decided on the
authority of the Laws of Oleron.
4"It is frequently stated that the earliest maritime laws were the Rhodian
Laws which originated on the Island of Rhodes in the Eastern Mediterranean
about 9oo B. C., but modern scholarship has questioned the historical accuracy of
this view. Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 32In. el seg. The other maritime codes
which influenced the development of the law of admiralty in England are referred
to by Lord Esher, Master of the Rolls, in The Gas Float Whitton No. 2, [1896]
Probate 42, at 4 7, in discussing the subject of the origin of that law:" 'It is not the
ordinary municipal law of the country, but it is the law which the English Court
of Admiralty either by Act of Parliament or by reiterated decisions and traditions
and principles has adopted as the English maritime law.' Neither the laws of the
Rhodians, nor of Oleron, nor of Wisbuy, nor of the Hanse Towns, are of them-
selves any part of the Admiralty law of England .... But they contain many
valuable principles and statements of marine practice which, together with
principles found in the Digest and in the French and other ordinances, were used
by the judges of the English Court of Admiralty when they were moulding and
reducing to form the principles and practice of their Court." See Mears, op. cit.
supra, at 327, and I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 527 et seq., 559.
453 KENT, op. cit. note 443, at 12 et seq.; 5 Holdsworth, loc. cit. note 442; I
Twiss, Sir Travers, INTRODUCTION TO THE BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMIRALTY
(1876) lvii el seg.; Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 325. The Laws of Oleron and other
mediaeval maritime codes are translated in MALYNES, Gerard, LEX MERCATORIA
(3d ed. 1686), in I PETERS' ADMIRALTY DEcIsIoNs APPENDIX (1807) iii, in 3o Fed.
Cas. (1897) 1171, and in SAYRE, Francis Bowes, CASES ON THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
(1929) I. It is possible that the Laws of Oleron derived from the Spanish Las
Siete Partidas, Fifth Partida, Title IX. See LOBINGIER, Charles Sunner, INTRO-
DUCTION TO LAS SiETE PARTMAS (Samuel P. Scott's translation, 1931) lv.
416Queen Eleanor is supposed to have established this for the benefit of
her insular possession of Oleron. Some sources, however, attribute it to
Richard I. Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 325; 1 Twiss, op. cit. note 445, at lxii.
441 HOLDSwORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 527; 5 ibid. 35, 70 et seg.; Mears, op. cit.
note 442, at 339n.; SENIOR, Op. cit. note 348, at 5o. It has been surmised that both
the Laws of Oleron and the Maritime code in Las Siete Partidas were derived
from the Consolato. LOBINGIER, loc. cit. note 445.
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English compilation of unknown authorship completed early in the
fifteenth century."8
The first courts of the sea were the primitive popular courts of the
seaport towns, which were strikingly like the piepoudre courts or
Law Merchant courts of the fairs."9 After the Conquest many sea-
coast municipalities claimed the right to hold such courts by recogni-
tion in their royal charters and bitterly fought the encroaching juris-
diction of the king's courts of common law and admiralty.4 0 Even-
tually, all these local courts succumbed to the rising power of the
royal tribunals except the admiralty court of the five channel ports,
known as the Cinque Ports,451 which, because of their defensive im-
portance, were permitted to retain their ancient privilege of maritime
jurisdiction down to modem times.42 In later centuries this jurisdic-
tion was exercised by the Lord Warden and Admiral of the Cinque
Ports" 3 and covered criminal, civil, equitable and admiralty causes.4 4
His determinations were not subject to review by the superior courts
of common law at Westminster but by the Privy Council.
415
485 HOLDSwoRTiH, op. cit. note 2, at 125 et seq. The BLACK BOOK OF THE
ADMIRALTY, edited by SIR TRAVERS Twiss, was published at London in 1871.
It contains an excellent historical introduction.
'"Such a popular tribunal sat at Ipswich in Anglo-Saxon days. 2 Twiss, op.
cit. note 445, at viii; Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 324; I HOLDSWORTII, op. cit. note 2,
at 531; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 222.
For the piepoudre courts, see note III, supra.
45OI HOLDSWORTH, loc. cit. note 449.
r'The name is pronounced "sink ports." The Cinque Ports were Dover, Hast-
ings, Romney, Hythe, and Sandwich, to which were added, in the reign of Richard
I, Winchelsea and Rye. Mears, op. ct. note 442, at 313; 2 MARSDEN, SELECT
PLEAS IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY (Ii Selden Society, 1897) xxi e Seg.; 3
BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 79.
'"In return for this privilege of jurisdiction the Cinque Ports were bound to
provide on royal call once a year a certain number of ships of war, manned and
equipped, (the number varying in different reigns), and to maintain them for
fifteen days at their own expense, the king thereafter to have the use of them at
his cost as long as needed. The Court of the Cinque Ports still sits and hears
causes. Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 315n.; I HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 533;
2 MARSDEN, loc. cit. note 451. All the other local courts of admiralty were
abolished by the MUNIcIPAL REF OR ACT, 5 & 6 WIL. IV, c. 76 (1835).
"The Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports was also Constable of Dover Castle,
which was regarded as "the key and barrier of the whole kingdom." HALE,
DE PoRriBus MARis, published in I HARGRAvE'S LAW TRACTS (1787) 45, 113;
Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 313n.
raThe civil jurisdiction, both at law and in equity, of the Cinque Ports was
taken away by I8 & i9 VicT. c. 48 (1855), but the admiralty jurisdiction was
preserved.
4"Appeals may be made to the Admiralty Court of the Cinque Ports in admir-
alty cases in county courts within the territorial jurisdiction of the Lord Warden.
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The central jurisdiction over maritime affairs in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries was exercised by the Council, or by auditores
specially chosen by the king for a particular case, and sometimes in
the latter part of the period by the new royal courts.4 6 The captains
of the royal navy, originally officers of the Cinque Ports, possessed
administrative authority over their fleets. 457  In the fourteenth
century the king began to appoint admirals, who at least as early as
,357 took to exercising judicial powers. This was officially recognized
by 136o, when the letters patent creating an admiral began specifically
to empower him to hold pleas and to punish offenders.418 During the
next half century there might be from one to three admirals, each of
whom held a court. The grants of judicial power in the patents were
vague, and the authority exercised by the admirals was correspond-
ingly large. Two statutes of the reign of Richard 1 41 charged the
admirals with usurpation of jurisdiction, and enacted that the
admiralty should have no cognizance of "contracts, pleas, and
quarrels, and all other things rising within the bodies of the counties,
as well by land as by water, and also of wreck of the sea." It was
conceded, however, that the Admiral had criminal jurisdiction of
murder and mayhem at sea or below the first bridges of the rivers
flowing into the sea.
The High Court of Admiralty, the successor of these courts of the
several admirals, dates from the early fifteenth century, when a single
Lord High Admiral of England was appointed, who established a
central prerogative court of marine jurisdiction at London.460 The
Wars of the Roses so engrossed men's attention that naval matters
were neglected, but with the discovery of America during the reign of
COUNTY COURTS ADmiRALTY JURISDICTION ACT, 31 & 32 VICT. c. 71, § 33 (1868).
Appeals from the decisions of the Lord Warden lie directly to the Privy Council.
See note 647, infra.
4161 MARSDEN, op. cit. note 176, at xvii; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 544
el seg.; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 1O3.
"7INDERWiCK, op. cit. note 121, at 97; 2 STUBBS, op. cit. note 5, at 302; PRO-
THERO, op. cit. note I69, at cxxi.
45I HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 545; I MARSDEN, op. cit. note 176, at xlii;
LEADAM AND BALDwIN, op. cit. note 185, at xxviii.
45 13 RiCH. II, st. i, c. 5 (1389), and 15 RICH. II, c. 3 (1391). 2 HEN. IV, c. II
(1400) gave an action on the case for double damages to one who was sued !a
Admiralty contrary to the statute of 13 RICH. II.
4601 MARSDEN, Op. cit. note 176, at li et seg.; i HoLDswoRTB:, op. cit. note 2, at
549. Originally the High Court of Admiralty sat at Orton Key near London
Bridge; when Doctors' Commons was established the court sat there. I MARSDEN,
op. cit. supra, at lxxix; i HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 547; 3 BLACKSTONE, Op.
cit. note 23, at 69; INDERWICK, op. cit. note 121, 100. See note 49o , infra.
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Henry VII,46 over-seas commerce was given a tremendous impetus,
and in consequence the Court of Admiralty became a tribunal of
increasing importance.4 2 A statute of I54ou brought within its
cognizance contracts made abroad, bills of exchange and all matters
relating to shipping and cargo, such as charter-parties, freight,
warranties of seaworthiness, salvage and insurance. Henry VIII's
patents went even further conferring jurisdiction over "any thing,
matter, or cause whatsoever done, or to be done, as well upon the sea
as upon sweet waters and rivers from the first bridges to the sea,"
statutes or royal ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding.46 The
Court of Admiralty also administered the royal droits or perquisites
of the sea-the right to flotsam, jetsam, treasure, deodands, royal
fish, wrecks, etc., which were usually granted to the admiral in his
patent.4 Owing to dissatisfaction with admiralty's punishment of
piracy and murder, its criminal jurisdiction was taken away by 28
Hen. VIII, c. iS (1536) and vested in special commissioners, practi-
cally all of whom were common law judges, with directions to try and
punish the offenders according to the common law.40
The Tudors enhanced the power of the court of admiralty, as they
did that of the other prerogative courts, in order to strengthen their
system of direct government by the crown. Under their patronage
it enjoyed the dignity of a court of record, and aided by the broad
extension of its jurisdiction soon became one of the great courts of the
realm. 4 7 The exploits of the English buccaneers on the Spanish Main
"'7 HENRY VII (1485-1509).
40I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 546; I MARSDEN, Op. cit. note 176, at Ivii
el seg.; Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 350; 2 STREET, op. cit. note 195, at 332.
4'32 HEN. VIII, c. 14.
4U1 MARSDEN, op. cit. note 176, at lix; i HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 549;
Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 352; CARTER, op. cit. note 41, at 172.
65Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 318; i HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 559 et seg.;
2 MARSDEN, op. cit. note 176, at xxiv et seg. Cf. note 107, supnra.
'"The Lord Chancellor named the commission, which was composed of the
Admiral or his deputy, and three or four "such other substanciall persons"; these
latter came in time to be always common law judges. The Act of 1536 was
limited to treasons, felonies, robberies, murders and confederacies; this was
extended by 39 GEo. III, C. 37 (1799) to all crimes on the high seas. In 1834 the
CENTRAL CIMINAr. COURT ACT, 4 & 5 WIL. IV, c. 36, § 22, transferred this
jurisdiction to the court created by that statute, and by 7 & 8 VIcT. C. 2 (1844) the
same jurisdiction was extended to justices of oyer, terminer and gaol delivery.
i HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 551; CARTER, op. cit. note 41, at 171. This
transfer of jurisdiction over offenses at sea to the ordinary criminal courts by the
last mentioned Act was confirmed in the CRIMINAL LAW CONSOLIDATION ACTS of
i86x, 24 & 25 VicT. c. 96, § r15, c. 97, § 72 and cc. 98 to ioo, inclusive.
"71 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 552.
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made this, indeed, the golden age of admiralty. As was to be expected,
the hostility which led to the statutes of Richard II revived in the
reign of Elizabeth. The common law courts at Westminster vindi-
cated their jurisdiction by writs of prohibition to Admiralty based
upon those statutes, while Admiralty retaliated with contempt pro-
ceedings against litigants who resorted to its rivals.48 8 At first the
prohibitions were used merely to confine the Court of Admiralty
within its former limits; later they were issued to protect the jurisdic-
tion over contracts made or transitory torts committed abroad which
the common law courts had seized from admiralty by permitting the
laying of a fictitious venue in England as if those contracts or wrongs
had occurred in the homeland.4 9 Coke denied the status of Admiralty
as a court of record, since it kept no parchment record in Latin, and,
theref6re, he held that it could neither fine nor imprison.470 Two com-
promises with the common law judges in 1575 and in 1632 failed to
,protect the admiralty jurisdiction; it was steadily curtailed by the
common law.4 7 ' The court itself survived throughout the Civil War,
during which the office of Lord High Admiral was abolished, but its
business continued to be slight.47 2 In the nineteenth century, how-
ever, it was reorganized and its jurisdiction once more extended by
statute.47 Under the Judicature Act of 1873, the Court of Admiralty
4181 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 553; 2 MARSDEN, op. cit. note 176, at xii et
seg., xi et seg., lxv et seq.; 2 STREET, op. cit. note 195, at 332; Mears, op. cit. note
442, at 36o.
469 HoLDswORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 554; CARTER, op. cit. note 41, at x74; Mears,
loc. cit. note 468; SCOTT, Austin, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT
LAw (1922) Chap. I-Venue and Jurisdiction; Foster, Roger S., Place of Trial in
Civil Actions (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 1217. See note 59I, infra.
4781 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 553; 5 ibid. 159 el seg.; COKE, op. cit. note 7,
at 135. But Admiralty and the other prerogative courts continued habitually to
exercise this jurisdiction until some years after the death of Coke. 5 HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. supra; at i6o. The Admiralty was made a court of record by
statute in 1861. See note 473, infra.
n
7
2CARTER, op. cit. note 41, at 173 et seg.; I HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 553
d Seg.; 2 MARSDEN, op. cit. note 176, at xiv.
Coke's view of the proper admiralty jurisdiction is set forth in 12 Coke's Rep.
79 (x6ir), and in COKE, op. cit. note 7, at I34. In reply to Coke, Dr. Richard
Zouch, once judge of the High Court of Admiralty, wrote his authoritative
JURISDICTION OF THE ADMIRALTY OF ENGLAND ASSERTED (1663), which may be
found in MALYN s, op. cit. note 445.
472Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 358 et seg.
4"The ADMIRALTY COURT ACTS of 1840, 3 & 4 VICT. cc. 65, 66, liberalized the
procedure and increased the powers of the court. In 1854 the second ADMIRALTY
COURT ACT and the MERCHANT SHIPEPING ACT, 17 & 18 VicT. cc. 78, 1o4, made
further procedural changes and amplified the power of the court with regard to
seamen's wages and salvage. The third ADmIRALTY COURT, ACT, 24 & 25 VCT. c.
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was merged in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
High Court of Justice.
The Prize Court originated simply as the prize jurisdiction, as
distinguished from the "instance", or ordinary jurisdiction, of the
Court of Admiralty. Not until after the Reformation did it evolve as
a distinct session of the admiralty court sitting for prize matters.474
Its distinctive character was emphasized by the practice which grew
up in the eighteenth century for the king to issue a special commission
to the Admiral at the outbreak of a war authorizing a judge of his
court to sit as prize judge.475 The Prize Court exercised the authority
of the Lord High Admiral to recommend the issuance of letters of
marque and reprisal ,4 to administer division of prize money and to
determine the legality of captures at sea.477 It attained its greatest
prominence under Lord Stowell,478 eldest brother of Lord Chancellor
Eldon, during the Napoleonic Wars. He it was who in this court
moulded much of our present international law relating to the war-
time rights of belligerent and neutral nations at sea. In 1864 the
Court of Admiralty was permanently vested with the prize jurisdic-
tion by statute, thus obviating the old system of special commis-
sions. 479 Under the Judicature Acts the prize jurisdiction is now
exercised by the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
High Court of Justice.
480
io (1861), gave the admiralty jurisdiction of claims for building, equipping, and
repairing ships, claims for necessaries supplied to ships, claims for damage to
cargo, for damage done by a ship, for salvage of life, for wages, for disbursements
by a master, and claims on registered mortgages on ships. Section 13 of the Act
made the Admiralty a court of record, and Section I4 declared that its decrees
should have the effect of judgments at law.
4741 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 561 et seg.; FosER, op. cit. note 377, at 9.
4 T Since the office of Lord High Admiral has been in commission this commission
issues to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. FosTER. op. cit. note 377, at
io; x HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 564.
47Originally the Chancellor issued letters of reprisal, authorizing those who
had been robbed by vessels of another nationality to recoup their losses upon any
ships from that country. I MARSDEN, op. cit. note 176, at xvi. Later this author-
ity was exercised by the Council, but the Admiralty passed upon the validity of
the claim for letters before the Council issued them. I MARSDEN, op. cit. supra, at
lXviii; 2 ibid. xviii: 477 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 561 et seg.
4'7 Wiliam Scott, Baron Stowell, was judge of the High Court of Admiralty
from 1798 to 1827. For an interesting biographical sketch of Lord Stowell, see
BENTWICK, Norman, GREAT JURisTs OF THE WORLD (Continental Legal History
Series, 1914) 517. 41'27 & 28 VicT. C. 25, § 4-
48 To settle any doubt on this question, the SUPREME COURT OF JUDIcATURE
ACT of 1891, 54 & 55 VITo. c. 53, was passed, stating that such was the effect of
the Act of 1873. However, the prize jurisdiction is still distinct from the instance
jurisdiction, for appeals from the former go directly to the Privy Council, whereas
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The Civilians and the Court of Admiralty
The Lord High Admiral was empowered by the royal letters patent
of his appointment to deputize one learned in the admiralty law to
exercise as his lieutenant and judge the maritime jurisdiction of the
High Court of Admiralty. From 1689 the office of Lord High Admiral
has been nearly always in commission, that is confided to Lords
Commissioners in Admiralty appointed to carry on its functions; since
then the judge of the Court of Admiralty has been named directly by
the crown and process has issued in the name of the sovereign.48 1 In
general, the admiralty bench seems to have consisted of but this
single judge although occasionally one or two additional judges ap-
pear to have been specially commissioned to sit in Admiralty.42 As
early as the fifteenth century it became the custom for the judge of
the High Court of Admiralty to be a doctor of laws and the civilians
gained the exclusive right to practice before it.413
These civilians were very learned men holding degrees from the
great universities of England or the continent in which only the Canon
Law and the Roman Civil Law were taught.48 1 Students of the
common law studied in their own special law colleges at London,
called the Inns of Court, with which were associated the Inns of
Chancery.4 5 Prior to the Reformation the paramount position of the
appeals from the latter lie through the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords.
See note 647, infra.
"all MARSDEN, Op. cit. note 176, at xlii; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 393;
MARSDEN, ADMIRALTY CASES, 1648-i84 o (1885) 345; FOSTER, IoC. Cit. note 474.
42 MARSDEN, Op. cit. note 176, at xii; Mears, op. cit. note 442, at 359; CARTER,
op. cit. note 68, at io3. The judge of the Court of Admiralty did much of his work
through his Surrogates, who were in effect subordinate judges appointed by him
and possessing co6rdinate jurisdiction with him unless expressly restricted.
FOSTER, op. cit. note 377, at io; BOUVIER, op. cit. note io7, tit., Surrogate.
4uSEMOR, op. cit. note 348, at 31 et seg.
4 For the teaching of the Canon Law and Roman Civil Law in the universities,
and the great rivalry between the two systems, see MAITLAND, op. cit. note 364,
at 93; 2 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 133, 137, 14r. The first university
professorship of common law was the Vinerian chair, established at Oxford in
1758, first occupied by Sir William Blackstone, to whose famous commentaries on
the common law we probably owe the fact that America remained a common-law
country. The Downing Professorship of the Laws of England was established at
Cambridge in i8oo. The present Vinerian professor is Sir William S. Holdsworth.
I BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23 (Lewis' ed. 19o2), at 3on.
4"ODGERS, LEcTUR s ON THE INNS OF COURTS AND OF CHANCERY (1912); 2
HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 493 et seq.; 4ibid. 229 eIseq.,264etseq.; HERBERT,
William, ANTIQUITIES OF THE INNS OF COURT AND CHANCERY (1804) 165 et seq.;
PULLING, op. cit. note 145, at 123 et seq. The civilians and their ancient learning
were banished from the common law courts in the late thirteenth century, in the
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church attracted the best minds to the universities to study the Canon
Law, since to be eligible to preside or practice in the ecclesiastical
courts one must be a canonist; and as a knowledge of the Roman Civil
Law opened the way to practice and a judgeship in Admiralty and
the other courts of the civilians, the candidate usually sought degrees
in both the older systems of law.418 Cambridge, following the ancient
tradition of Bologna,48 7 granted a single degree attesting proficiency
in both the Canon Law and Civil Law systems,-namely, the "LL.B."
or the "LL.D.", our familiar Bachelor of Laws and Doctor of Laws
degrees.4 8 Strangely eiough, the former is now granted for achieve-
reign of Edward I, the English Justinian. 4 HOLDSWORTn, Op. Cit. sUpla, at 230;
2 ibid. 287.
4864 HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 231 et seg.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 364, at
93 et seg. 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra, at 238, lists seven spheres of practice
open to civilians: the ecclesiastical courts; the region of diplomacy,. where inter-
national law was becoming important; the admiralty; arbitrations ordered by the
Council in cases of commercial or maritime law; cases in the Star Chamber, the
Court of Requests, or Chancery, involving principles outside the common law;
administrative problems of state, the courts of the Constable and Marshal (see
infra) and of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge.
"The degree of D. C. L. or LL.D. became the necessary passport to the College
of Advocates at Doctors' Commons; this requirement was however abolished in
x856." 2 MULLINGER, James Bass, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE (1873) 127n.
It should be noted that this requirement of training in the civil law was instituted
after Henry VIII had forbidden the teaching of Canon Law at the Universities in
1535 and thus left the field to the Doctor of the Civil Law. STUBBS, LECTURES
ON MEDIEVAL AND MODERN HISTORY (1886) 319; I PHILLIMORE, Sir Robert,
COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1871) lix; MAITLAND, op. cit. note
364, at 92. With the proscription of the Canon Law in the Universities, the
teaching of the Roman Civil Law practically ceased. Henry, alarmed at the
prospect of a dearth of diplomats trained in this international body of law, hastily
established the Regius professorships at Cambridge and Oxford to reviveits teach-
ing. 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 42.
4870ne who mastered both the Civil and the Canon Law at Bologna was known
as Doctor Utriusque Juris (Doctor of Both Laws). I RA SEDALL, Hastings, UNI-
VERSITIES op EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1895) 137n., 222; SENIOR, op. cit. note
348, at 4.
'88Cambridge originally gave the degree of Doctor Utriusque Juris U.U.D.),
but later adopted the LL.D. (Doctor Legum) and LL.B. (Baccalaureus Legum).
I MULLINGER, James Bass, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE (1873) 39; SENIOR, Op cit.
note 348, at 31-34. Cf. MAITLAND, op. cit. note 364, at 93n. Oxford granted the
separate degrees of B.C.L. and D.C.L. for the bachelor and doctor of Civil Law
respectively, and in the Canon Law the degrees of Bachelor of Decrees and of
Doctor of Decrees. I MALLET, Charles Edward, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
OXFORD (1924) 194; 2 ibi. 85; CUBBERLY, Elwood P., READINGS IN THE HISTORY
OF EDUCATION (1920) 173, from 3 RASHDALL, op. cit, note 487, at 452-5. At
Cambridge the combined degrees survived the abolition of the teaching of Canon
Law and are still conferred. While the Roman Law still constitutes a required and
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ment in the once despised unacademic common law, while the latter
has become an honorary recognition of attainment presumably
equivalent to the ten years of scholarly toil required in mediaeval
days to earn it.
4s 9
Early in the sixteenth century the judges and practitioners in the
civil law and the canon law founded the Association of Doctors of
Laws, and this body established the famous Doctors' Commons, or
college of the civilians, on the pattern of the Inns of Courts of the
common lawyers.490 After the days of Coke, the common law courts
steadily gained a supremacy over their prerogative rivals by assimi-
lating the law merchant,491 by supplanting the canon law492 and by
replacing the clerical chancellors with common law chancellors4
The prerogative courts, as they came under the influence of the com-
mon law psychology, inclined more and more to case law methods of
precedent and analogy instead of adhering to their ancient system of
interpretation and application of the authoritative texts. 4 1 This
important part of the work leading to the B.C.L. and D.C.L. at Oxford, those
degrees are now chiefly based upon examinations in various fields of English law.
489 RASHDALL, op. cit. note 487, at 222. In the Universities of Cambridge and
London, and perhaps in other British universities, the LL.D. degree is c6nferred
both in course and as an honorary degree. The same is true of the D.C.L. degree
at Oxford.
4980Although the Association of Doctors of Laws was organized about the be-
ginning of the reign of Hem-y VIII (I509-1547), they did not secure their Doctors'
Commons until x568, and the Association was not incorporated until 1768.
SENIOR, op. cit. note 348, at 59 et se .; 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 235 et
seq.; FOSTER, Op. cit. note 377, at 5 et seq.; 2 PHILLIMORE, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW OF
THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (x873) 1218.
Charles Dickens, in DAVID COPPERFIELD, Chap. 23 et seq., exposes the bewilder-
ing intricacy and the inefficiency and delay of Doctors' Commons procedure before
the reforms of the nineteenth century.
491The greater part of this adoption of the law merchant was the work of Lord
Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1756 to 1788. Scrutton, op. cit.
note 58, at 7; Burdick, op. cit. note 58, at 34,45 et seq.; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at
228; JENKS, op. cit. note 46, at28; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 572; 5 ibid. 147.
402The continuous retreat of the ecclesiastical law before the common law is
described under the discussion of the Ecclesiastical Courts, supra.
423See note 261, supra. On the Masters in Chancery, see note 264, supra.
'94Prior to the seventeenth century the Admiralty records did not report the
judicial reasoning, but merely the decision between the parties. MARSDEN, Op.
cit. note 45r, prints only pleas and other procedural papers for the period i547-
16o2. But in the seventeenth century it became customary to make more com-
plete notes of the cases, and in the eighteenth century both the arguments of
counsel and the opinions of the judge were preserved. Some of these are published
in MARSDEN, op. cit. note 481, supra. The first publication of contemporary
decisions for the guidance of the profession was I RoBINSON's ADMIRALTY RE-
PORTS (1798-1799).
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fundamental change enabled the common lawyers gradually to force
their way into the ancient halls of the civilians, and the last citadel
was carried when in i858 common lawyers were admitted to practice
in Admiralty.4 95 About the same time, the Doctors' Commons was
sold and the college was dissolved.48 Although provision was made
in the Judicature Act of 1873 for the admission of civil lawyers to
practice in the Supreme Court of Judicature, 4 7 there no longer re-
mained in England a court, a law and a profession wholly alien to the
common law.
LESSER PREROGATIVE COURTS
The military counterpart of the High Court of Admiralty was the
Court Military, or Court of Chivalry, more commonly known as the
Court of the Constable and Marshal.498 This court was originally
presided over by two hereditary officials, the Lord High Constable
and the Earl Marshal of England, since they were commanders of
the royal army in the middle ages;499 but after 152 1, the Earl Marshal
4
"SENIoR, op. cit. note 348, at iiO. The ecclesiastical jurisdiction over testa-
mentary and divorce causes had previously (1857) been vested in a Court of
Probate and a Divorce Court, both of which had been thrown open to the common
lawyers. The acts creating those courts also provided that the civilians might
continue to practice therein and the PROBATE COURT ACT (20 & 21 VICT. c. 77,
§§ 40, 41) went further by permitting the practitioners in the old court to appear
as barristers at law in any court of law or equity. See also MATRImoNIAL CAUSES
ACT of 1857, 20 & 21 VICT. c. 85, § 15.
4920 & 21 VICT. c. 77, §§ 1x6, 117 (1857) authorized this step, and it was done
the following year. 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 235; FOSTER, Op. cit. note
377, at 6.
19736 & 37 VICT. c. 66, § 87: "From and after the commencement of this Act all
persons admitted as solicitors, attorneys or proctors of or by law empowered to
practice in any Court, the jurisdiction of which is hereby transferred to the High
Court of Justice or the Court of Appeal, shall be called Solicitors of the Supreme
Court, and shall be entitled to the same privileges and be subject to the same
obligations, so far as circumstances will permit, as if this Act had not been passed;
and all persons who from time to time if this Act had not been passed, would have
been entitled to be admitted as solicitors, attorneys, or proctors of or been by law
empowered to practice in any such Courts, shall be entitled to be admitted and to
be called Solicitors of the Supreme Court, .. ." See also note 495, supra.
4181 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 573 et seq.; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23,
at IO3 et seq.; MAITLAND, Op. cit. note 5, at 266 et seg.; I HALE, op. cit. note 278, at
52 et seg.; COKE, op. cit. note 7, at X23; Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically
Considered (1902) 18 L. Q. REv. 117.
41"V[T]hey were two great ordinary officers, anciently, in the king's army; the
constable being in effect the king's general; and the marshal was employed in
marshalling the king's army, and keeping the list of the officers and soldiers
therein; and his certificate was the trial of those whose attendance was necessary."
I HALE, op. cit. note 278, at 54.
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sat alone, for in that year, on the execution of Stafford, Duke of Buck-
ingham, the office of Constable was forfeited to the crown.1°°
The Court of the Constable and Marshal was a prerogative court'"
administering the Roman civil law °2 so far as not contradictory to the
statutes of the realm, and possessing a military jurisdiction and a
jurisdiction in matters of chivalry. The military jurisdiction was
both civil and criminal."3 On the civil side it embraced contracts and
all other matters touching war and deeds of arms, while on the crimi-
nal side it constituted a summary and capital punitive jurisdiction
over those guilty of infringement of army rules or of acts of rebellion
against the sovereign. As a military prize court it dealt with prison-
ers of war and captures of property by military forces.5°4 In the exer-
cise of its jurisdiction of chivalry, it regulated the ancient system of
heraldry touching such matters as the right to crests and coats of arms,
the right of place and precedence, and the slander of noblemen." 5
The common lawyers became jealous of this broad and ill defined
jurisdiction, and, as in the case of Admiralty, they secured the passage
of two statutes in the reign of Richard II (1377-399), which declared
that no cause cognizable at common law should be tried before the
Constable and Marshal.5"' "The exercise of martial law, whereby
5° HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at II6 n.; 3 BLACKSTONE, Op. Cit. note 23, at 68.
5021 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 574, points out that an appeal was taken
from this court to the Council in Parson of Langar v. Conyngsby (1361), in
LnKADn AND BAL.DWIN, op. cit. note 185, at 47; but Coke states that the appeal
lay to the king in person. COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 125, cited in 3 BLACKSTONE, op.
cit. note 23, at 68.
6025 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 15; I HALE, op. cit. note 278, at 52.
"... [A]lways, preparatory to an actual war, the kings of this realm, by advice
of the constable and marshal, were used to compose a book of rules and orders for
the due order and discipline of their officers and soldiers, together with certain
penalties on the offenders; and this was called martial law. We have extant in the
Black Book of the Admiralty and elsewhere several exemplars of such military
laws." I HALE, op. cit. supra, at 54.
Like the other civil law courts, the Court of the Constable and Marshal was




31 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 573 et seg.; i HALE, op. Cit. note 278, at 54.
r°*Holdsworth, op. cit. note 498, at ii8.
'l6i HOLDSWORTH, op..cit. note 2, at 578 et seq.; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23,
at 104 et seq.; I HALE, op. cit. note 278, at 53.
568 Ricn. II, c. 5 (1384); 13 _ICH. II, st. I, c. 2 (1389). It was enacted by I
HEN. IV, c. 14 (1399), "That all appeals to be made of things done within the
realm, shall be tried and determined by the good laws of the realm, made and used
in the time of the King's noble progenitors; and that all appeals to be made of
things done out of the realm, shall be tried and determined before the constable
and marshal of England for the time being." Thus this court gained jurisdiction
over crimes committed abroad. I HALE, op. cit. note 278, at 54.
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any person should lose his life, or member, or liberty, may not be
permitted in time of peace, when the king's courts are open for all
persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land," nor as
to civilians even in time of war. 01 Edward IV (1461-1483), the
Tudors, and James I (I6O3-i625) disregarded this restriction and on
several occasions brought civilians to trial and death in this military
court. 05 The Petition of Right of 1628 declared such practices to be
contrary to the law of the land." 9 By the end of the seventeenth
century the criminal jurisdiction of the court had become obsolete,
owing to the institution of courts martial conducted by army offi-
cers. 10 Even earlier the common law courts had taken over the civi
jurisdiction of the military courts."' Its jurisdiction in matters of
chivalry perished when in 1703 the Queen's Bench declared that the
Marshal alone had no authority to try a case of slander of nobility.,
12
Soon after, the power to determine questions of heraldry fell into the
hands of the heralds attendant upon the court.1 ' In cases of impor-
tance, however, concerning the right to some dignity or honor, the
king may still delegate his prerogative to determine the question to
the Court of the Marshal.514
617I HALE, op. cit. note 278, at 55, citing the case of the Earl of Kent in 15 Euw.
II (13o37-1326) and I EDW. III (1,326-1377).
On the question of what is martial law and when is it available, see, in addition
to Holdsworth, loc. cit. note 498; Pollock, What is Martial Law ([902) z8 L. Q.
Rlv. 152; Richards, H. Erle, Martial Law (i9o2) x8 L. Q. REv. 133; Dodd,
Cyril, The Case of Marais (19o2) i8 L. Q. REv. 143; Page, Martial Law-A Study
in Comparative Law (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 349; Ansell, Gen. S. T., Military
Justice (1919) 5 CORNELL LAW QuARTERLY I; Ballantine, Henry W., Constitu-
tional Limitations on the War Power (1917) 6 CALIF. L. REv. 134, reprinted in
(x918) 3 VA. L. REa. 721.
SOSMAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 267; 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 575.
15191 HALE, op. cit. note 2, at 55; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 576.
slot HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 577. The use of courts martial was legalized
by the ANNUAL MUTINY ACTS governing the army, the first of which was passed in
1689. The ARMY DIsciPLLm AND REGULATION ACT of 1879, amended in 188i,
provided for courts martial and established a permanent military code. This act
is brought into effect by an annual act of Parliament. Holdsworth, op. cit. note
498, at 122; ANSON, LAW AND CUsTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION (Gwyer's ed. 1922)
324 et seg.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 448 et seg.
5113 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at IO3.
'"Chambers v. Jennings, 7 Modern Reports 125; I HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2,
at 579.
5133 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 105; x HoLDswoRT, loc. cit. note 512;
22 HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at 288.
W122 HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at 277; There is still an Earl Marshal and a
Marshal's court; the office of Marshal is hereditary. MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at
266.
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The Court of Wards and Liveries1 was one of Henry VIII's new
courts established by statute in I540 to administer the king's feudal
incidents of wardship and marriage. It sat at Westminster until
abolished by the Long Parliament a century later. 16 Other lesser
prerogative courts existed at various times, a number of them primar-
ily for the conservation of royal prerogative rights, as in the case of
the ancient Courts of the Forest.117 It is impossible in this brief
survey to discuss further this class of prerogative courts, or the many
lesser common law courts, like the Court of the Marshalsea, which
exercised a common law jurisdiction within the verge, that is, within
twelve miles of the royal palace or royal abode.518 A law dictionary
lists ninety-three English courts as existing during the Westminster
epoch, but even this enumeration is incomplete.
5 1 9
II. The Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction
a. Subordinate Appellate Courts
JURISDICTION IN ERROR
On the Common Law side of Westminster Hall the review of de-
cisions from lower courts was either by a writ of false judgment or by
a writ of error. 20
5'632 HEN. VIII, c. 46 (i54o) created the Court of Wards, and 33 HEN. VIII, c.
22 (154') annexed the office of liveries to the court. COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 188
et Se.; INDERWICE, op. c. note 121, at 184.
516It was also formally abolished by the statute which did away with feudal
tenures, upon which it was founded. 12 CAR. II, C. 24 (166o); 3 BLACKSTONE, Op.
cit. note 23, at 258.
5171 HOLDSWORTH, op. Cit. note 2, at 94 et seg.; 9 HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at
iii et seg.; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 2z el seg.
5 1 Strangely enough, all of the numerous palace courts of the king's household
were courts of the common law, employing jury trials and subject to writ of error
from the House of Lords or the King's Bench. The Court of the Marshalsea held
pleas of thecrown, actions of debt, detinue, and trespass vi el armnis arising within
twelve miles of the royal presence, though in the tort actions one, and in the con-
tract actions both of the parties must be of the king's household. 3 HEN. VII, c. 14
(1486) and 33 HEN. VIII, c. 12 (154), which were repealed by 9 GEo. IV, c. 31
(1828), created courts with jurisdiction over crimes committed within the palace.
The Palace Court, established by James I, had jurisdiction over all personal
actions arising between any parties within twelve miles of the royal palace of
Whitehall. The Court of the Marthalsea and the Palace Court were abolished by
12 & 13 VICT. C. IO, § 13 (1849). 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 208 ei seq.;
3 BLACESTONE, 75 et seg.; 4 ibid. 276; 4 STEPHEN, op. cit. note 308, at 262.
511STIMsoN, Frederic J., CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY (igii) 130 et seg. 9 HALs-
BURY, op. cit. note 357, at 5 et seg., lists one hundred seventy-two courts in the one
broad class of "borough tnd local courts of record," most of them now in abeyance.
520Closely related to the appellate jurisdiction of the central courts of law was
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The Common Pleas and the King's Bench from the time of their
establishment reviewed judgments of inferior courts not of record by
the various writs of false judgment. 2' Such writs issued only to the
ancient communal and seigniorial courts in which the judges were
suitors.5 n Originally, the writ put the integrity of the local court on
trial. The county was likely to be fined or the lord to lose his franchise
if the judgment were reversed.en The decline of the local courts,
coupled with the fact that no costs were recoverable on a writ of false
judgment, made the resort to such writs very infrequent in later
centuries. 52 This method of review survived, however, until the
Judicature Acts.
The King's Bench was the primary court for review by writ of
error.52 As the only common law court coram rege, it exercised this
their power to remove cases from inferior courts and try them de novo. Cases from
inferior courts not of record could be removed at any time before judgment; cases
from inferior courts of record, such as the sheriff's tourn, the courts leet and the
justices' courts, could be brought up under certain statutory limitations, by writ
of certiorari or habeas corpus. I TIDD, William, PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF
KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS (3d Am. ed. x856) 397 et seg.; 2 ibid. 1134 et
seg.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 200,227 et seq.; 2 CHiTTY, op. cit. note 236,
at 316, 353, 388, 396.
M3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 34; 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 201;
2 TIDD, op. cit. note 520, at I187; 2 CHiTTY, op. cit. note 236, at 36o, 388.
m22 TIDD, loc. cit. note 520; 2 CHITTY, op. cit. note 236, at 36o. As pointed out in
note 3, supra, the term "suitors" here means not the litigants but those members
of the community who owed a duty to pay suit upon (to attend) the communal
courts as judges.
522 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 667; I HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit.
note 2, at Ii. m2 TIDD, op. cit. note 52o, at II88.
SiThe writ of error originally lay only for error in law appearing on the face of
the parchment record of the case. A second type of writ of error was introduced by
that great code of Edward I, the STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER II, r3 EDw. I, St. I,
c. 31 (r285), which provided for review of errors in the conduct of a trial by writ
of error on a bill of exceptions. The bill of exceptions was prepared by the attorney
for the plaintiff in error showing the rulings of the judge at the trial and the at-
torney's exceptions thereto. The trial judge was required to seal the bill of excep-
tions to assure their authenticity. This bil was attached to the parchment record,
and although it did not become a part thereof, it was removed with that record
into the appellate court. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 223.
The writ of error issued out of the writ-office of Chancery and ran in the name
of the king to the presiding judge of the inferior court directing him to send the
record of the case to the reviewing court. The plaintiff in error filed the writ and
his assignments of error with the clerk of that court. Thereupon, a writ of scire
facias (that you make known) issued to the defendant to answer said assignments
of error which he did by the plea "In nullo est erratum," thus joining issue on the
question of reversible error either in the record or the bill of exceptions. The case
then came on for argument before the full bench if in the King's Bench, or before
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appellate jurisdiction over the Common Pleas and all inferior courts
of record. 2 1 The Common Pleas shared this power to issue a writ of
error to such lower courts, but it was seldom exercised as plaintiffs in
error preferred to go directly to the King's Bench and thus avoid
the possibility of a double review. 2 7 From the beginning of the four-
teenth century to 1783 the King's Bench also exercised jurisdiction
in error over the Irish King's Bench,5 28 and from 1543 to 1830 over the
Courts of Great Sessions in Wales.
5 29
Among the changes and improvements of the great reform move-
ment of 1830 in England not. the least significant were those affecting
the appellate courts. In addition to abolishing the Welsh Courts and
the law courts of the County Palatine of Chester, and the creation of
a new court of Exchequer Chamber, the "Law Terms Act of i83o"m0
the Lords if in the House of Lords. Having heard the cause, the appellate court
decided the disputed questions of law and remitted the case to the court from
which it came (by a paper called a remittitur) for further proceedings in accord
with their decision. 2 TiDD, op. cit. note 520, at 1134 el seq.; 3 BLACKSTONE, Op.
cit. note 23, at 407. For the procedure in error in the House of Lords, see note 570,
infra.
Beginning law students are often confused in the study of appellate cases by the
frequent reversal of the positions of the parties to an action from those which
they occupied in the court below. This was because on error the case was regarded
as a new case in a new court and the party bringing it up was called the plaintiff
in error although he may have been the defendant below. I HOLDSWORTH, op.
cit. note 2, at 214. In most American jurisdictions, although not in the federal
c ourts, either by statute or rule of court, the parties now retain their original
positions with some descriptive word or phrase following their names to indicate
which is the appellant. See NEW YORK CIVIw PRACTICE ACT, § 561.
61r HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 222; BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 43;
CoE, op. cit. note 7, at 7; 2 CHiT-y, lc. cit. note 522; 2 TroD, op. cit. note 520, at
1137.
627The history of the concurrent jurisdiction in error of the Common Pleas was
reviewed in a footnote to Bruce v. Wait, I Manning & Granger 1 (1840). That
case was the last and apparently the only instance of its actual exercise. It would
seem that the fact that the Calendar of the King's Bench was two years in arrears
influenced the Common Pleas to issue a writ of error to the "Court of the Tolzey"
of Bristol, an ancient court of record by prescription. I HoLDswoRTH, op. cit.
note 2, at 202. On the Court of the Tolzey, see CARTER, op. cit. note 41, at 257n.
562PIKE, CoNsTITUTIoNAL HISTORY OF THE HOUsE OF LoRDs (1894) 30I; 2 TroD,
op. cif.note52o, at 114o; I STEPHEN, op. cit. note 308, at 56. The statute of 23 GEO.
III, c. 28 (1783) transferred this jurisdiction in error to the Irish House of Lords.
5292 TroD, op. cit. note 520, at 1138; I HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 131. This
jurisdiction vanished in I83O with the Welsh courts.
"Oxo GEo. IV & I WIL. IV, c. 70. This act is referred to as the LAW TERms Act
because it altered the dates for the holding of the quarterly terms of the superior
courts of common law at Westminster, although its other provisions mentioned in
the text were historically of far greater importance. On the terms of court see
note 246, supra.
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stripped the King's Bench of its jurisdiction in error over the Common
Pleas, and provided that all writs of error to the three superior courts
of common law of Westminster should be returnable to the new
Exchequer Chamber. The power of the King's Bench and Common
Pleas to review by writ of error judgments of inferior courts of record
continued until the Judicature Acts."'
The King's Bench exercised its jurisdiction in error over inferior
courts in criminal as well as in civil causes."' It should be noted,
however, that whereas from early times the writ of error issued of
right in civil cases, it could be obtained in criminal cases only by the
king's grace until i7o5, when a majority of the judges declared it
issued ex debito justitiae (as an obligation of justice, that is, "of right")
in misdemeanors; but it still remained of grace in treason and felony.03
Owing to this limitation of the jurisdiction in error in criminal cases,
the trial judges long ago developed a procedure of informal review
by reserving doubtful points of law for discussion with fellow judges
before imposing sentence."
In 1848.. this practice became the basis for the creation of the
Court for Crown Cases Reserved, consisting of all the common law
judges of England."' Five judges constituted a quorum, provided
there was a chief justice of one of the three superior courts of common
law among them to preside, but any one of them might require a
case to be referred to the entire bench.
There were several tribunals of intermediate appellate jurisdiction
63I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 222; 2 CmTTY, loc. cit. note 522; CARTER,
op. it. note 68, at 58. For the Common Pleas, see note 527, supra.
6221 HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 212 el seq.; MAiTLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 134;
CARTER, op. cit. note 41, at 88.
6NRegina v. Paty, 2 Salk. 5o3. For the earlier law, see the Rioters' Case, i Vern.
175 (1683). The subject is summarized by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Wilkes, 4
Burr. 2527, 2550 et seq. (1770). And see r HOLDSW.ORTH, op. ct. note 2, at 215.
S24I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 217. I STEPHEN, op. cit. note 439, at 311,
says: "The question reserved was argued before the judges by counsel, not in a
court of justice but at Serjeant's. Inn of which all the judges were members. If
they thought that the prisoner had been improperly convicted he received a free
pardon. If not, the sentence was executed or judgment was passed. No judgment
was delivered and no reasons were given in such cases, the whole proceeding being
of an informal kind."
' 1I & I2 VxcT. c. 78. This court survived the Judicature Acts, but the JUDICA-
TURE AcT OF 1873, § 47, required that the Lord Chief Justice of England be one of
the quorum of five judges. The Court for Crown Cases Reserved was abolished
by the CmnuNAL APPEAL ACT, 7 EDW. VII, C. 23 (i9o7).
31 STEPHEN, op. cit. note 439, at 312, refers to all the judges of England who
made up this court as fifteen in number. They numbered twelve at the time of
Slade's Case at the opening of the seventeenth century.
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between the common law courts at Westminster and the House of
Lords, each designated the Court of Exchequer Chamber. The
practice of informal review of reserved questions of criminal law dis-
cussed above was simply a new application of a custom which ap-
peared in the late thirteenth century whereby the judges of any one
of the superior courts of common law might in their discretion, after
hearing a case which they deemed of great public importance and
turning on a doubtful point of law, adjourn to the Exchequer
Chamber in Westminster Hall for argument before all the judges and
barons of England.57 That august assembly having declared its view
of the law involved, the court in which the case originated entered
judgment in accord therewith. This practice continued into the
seventeenth century.""
The first Court of Exchequer Chamber, which was erected in 1357"
to solve the vexed question of the jurisdiction in error over the
Exchequer, was undoubtedly patterned upon this unofficial tribunal.
The Exchequer was just coming to be recognized as a common law
court when in 3338 the King's Bench issued a writ of error to it, as in
the case of the Common Pleas, but the Barons refused to hand up the
record and certified their reasons to the king.O The new court of
Exchequer Chamber was empowered to review by writ of error
judgments from the common law side of the Exchequer.MI Its judges
were the Chancellor (or Lord Keeper) and the Lord Treasurer of
England, with the justices of the two Benches acting as advisers.
The second Court of Exchequer Chamber was established in 1585
by the famous statute of 27 Elizabeth (1558-I6o3)1 to review errors
of the King's Bench in civil actions originating there not touching
the crown. Before that the jurisdiction in error over the King's
Bench was vested in the House of Lords,M but the infrequency of
371 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 242; COKE, op. cit. note 7, at IO6, IO, 119;
3 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 56.
" 8Slade's Case, 4 Coke's Rep. 92b (x602) was twice argued by express command
of Queen Elizabeth before all the judges of England.- In the Case of Ship Money,
3 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 825 (1637), the judges, assembled in the Star Chamber
to receive their instructions from the Lord Chancellor before going on circuit,
gave the king an advisory opinion affirming the legality of the ship money tax.
The subsequent proceedings against John Hampden in the Court of the Exchequer
to compel payment of the tax were adjourned to the Exechequer Chamber for
argument before all the judges of England, and they again upheld the tax.
14931 EDw. III, St. I, C. 12. "°ToUT, op. cit. note 124, at 57.
"1 PIKE, INTRODUCTION TO YEAR BOOKS, 14 EDw. III (1888) xxi et seg.; I
HOLDswoRTr, op. cit. note 2, at 243; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 58.
mPIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 294; COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 105.
527 ELIZ. c. 8 (1585). The Act provided for review of the judgments of the
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Parliaments under the Tudors practically deprived litigants of that
remedy.4 The members of this second court were the judges of the
Common Pleas and of the Exchequer, or any six of them. In I83o a
third Court of Exchequer Chamber was created by a statutory con-
solidation of the two old Courts of Exchequer Chamber, which had
functioned side by side for centuries, into a single new intermediate
court of error bearing the ancient name." 5 This new Court of Ex-
chequer Chamber was vested with complete jurisdiction in error over
all three of the superior courts of common law. The system of man-
ning the second Court of Exchequer Chamber was extended to the
new court by providing that in each case the court should consist of
the judges of the two superior common law courts whose judgment
was not under review. This last Court of Exchequer Chamber
perished in the overthrow of the ancient common law judicial system
by the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875.
JURIsICTION oN APPEAL
The review of final orders and decrees in the prerogative courts
was by appeal, a procedure derived from the civil law. An appeal
differed from the writ of error in carrying to the higher court for
review the facts as well as the equity or law of the case. This distinc-
tion arose from the difference in method of trial, for in the prerogative
courts cases were tried by a judge without a jury, and, therefore, it
was felt that the judge-made findings of fact should be reviewed by
the appellate court. Originally appeals also differed from writs of
error in that they were not available as of right but only by royal
grace. After the House of Lords extended its appellate jurisdiction
over appeals from the chancellor, petitions for such appeals came to
be granted as of course and eventually as of right." It is significant
that the general progress of appellate procedure during the past
century has been to substitute for the common law writ of error and
the prerogative appeal the statutory appeal as a single method of
review for all cases.
47
King's Bench in actions of "debt, detinue, covenant, account, action upon the
case, ejectionefirmae, or trespass, first commenced or to be first commenced there,
(other than such only where the Queen's majesty shal be party)."
5"See note 586, infra.
6This was by the LAW TERms ACT, ii GEO. IV & I WIL. IV, c. 70 (1830).
E6t2 DANIELL, Edmund R., PLEADING AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF
CHANcERY (4th Am. ed. 1871) 1491; 3 BLACKSTONE, oP. cit. note 23, at 455. And
see notes 549 and 571 infra.
"7See Compter, Herman E., Effect of Statute Abolishing Writ of Error in Federal
Procedure (1929) 14 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY, 222, 223.
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The Court of Chancery at Westminster had no appellate jurisdic-
tion over other courts of equity, such as the Irish Chancery and the
Chancery courts of the counties palatine. 5  There was no provision
for appeals from Chancery in Tudor England except by petition to
the king for appointment of commissioners to reconsider his chancel-
lor's decree, but this was practically superseded when in the latter
half of the seventeenth century, as we shall see, the House of Lords
extended its appellate jurisdiction over appeals in equity from all
these Chancery courts.M9 The chancellor, however, was given an
appellate jurisdiction over the subordinate judges of his own court
by statute. An act of 1730 provided for appeal to him from the
orders of the Master of the Rolls, 15 0 and similar provision was made
upon the creation of vice-chancellorships in 1813 and i84i."6' Un-
fortunately, the burden of appeals from these several subordinate
equity tribunals proved so overwhelming that the congestion in the
Chancery docket was enhanced rather than alleviated by the addi-
tional judges.5
2
To correct this situation, a Court of Appeal in Chancery was
erected by statute in i85i,5 to hear appeals from these subordinate
courts of the Master of the Rolls and of the Vice Chancellors. The
Act providedfor the appointment of two Lords Justices of Appeal in
Chancery, and stated that the court might consist of the Lord Chan-
cellor sitting alone as theretofore, or associating with him one of said
Lords Justices, or that its jurisdiction might be exercised by the two
Lords Justices sitting together apart from the chancellor.6 This
court superseded the chancellor as an appellate tribunal and appeals
from it went directly to the House of Lords as they formerly had from
the chancellor.sn At the Judicature Acts the Court of Appeal in
Chancery was replaced by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court
of Judicature.
UsBut appeals lay to the chancellor from the Courts of Great Sessions of Wales,
and from the Lord Mayor's Court in London. 2 MADDOCK, op. cit. note 226, at
437. And see note 357, supra.
6'ADAMs, John, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EQUITY (Bispham's ed. 1868) 53,
744; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 373; PxE, op. cit. note 528, at 299. And
see note 571, infra.
E03 GEo. II, c. 30.
u'53 GEo. III, c. 24; 5 VICT. c. 5. Also see note 267, supra.
5652See note 268, supra. , i1 4 & 15 VICT. c. 83.
6"Section 8 of the act provided that the Lord Chancellor might request any
judge of the common-law courts, or the Master of the Rolls, or the Vice-Chancel-
lors, to assist and advise the Court of Appeal, "if any such Common Law Judge
shall find it convenient to attend upon such Request."
"sSee note 571, infra.
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The High Court of Delegates, as previously pointed out,m was the
highest appellate court of the ecclesiastical judicial system, and it
also heard appeals from Admiralty. This jurisdiction was vested in
the Privy Council in 1 8 3 2 ,57 when the High Court of Delegates was
abolished, and was transferred to the Judicial Committee of that
body upon its organization in the following year.518
The High Court of Admiralty heard appeals from the Vice-Admiral-
ty Courts established in various parts of the globe in the exercise of
the royal prerogative of justice.5 9 This appellate jurisdiction of the
High Court of Admiralty was transferred to the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in 1 83 3
.Ho
The Prize Commissioners constituted a tribunal analogous to the
High Court of Delegates. When the Prize Court separated from the
Admiralty in the seventeenth century, it became the custom for the
king at the beginning of his reign to issue a general commission to the
Privy Council empowering any three councillors to determine appeals
in prize cases, whether from the Prize Court or from the Vice-Admiralty
Courts of the colonies." ' In 1748 the common law judges were in-
cluded in the commission, 2 and after the appointment of a Vice-
Chancellor in 1814, he, too, was commissioned.m But the Judicial
Committee Act of 1833 also transferred this appellate jurisdiction to
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.,"
"6For a discussion of the origin and composition of the High Court of Delegates,
see supra, note 387 et seg.
5'72 & 3 WIL. IV, C. 92.
6S3 & 4 WIL. IV, C. 41. See note 645, infra.
6
95 CHALMERS, George, COLONIAL OPINIONS (1858) 518, 532; 3 BLACKSTONE, Op.
cit. note 23, at 69; the additional statement in Blackstone that the Privy Council
possessed concurrent jurisdiction appears to be unsupported by authority.
" 0 ee note 558, supra. The colonial courts exercised a "wide range of admiralty
jurisdiction... as compared with the restricted jurisdictions in England resulting
from the jealousies of the common law judges there." Dutch, Charles F., re-
viewing HOUGH, Judge Charles M., REPORTS OF CASES IN THE VICE ADMIRALTY
oF NEWYORK AND IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY OF THE STATE OF NEWYORK,
1715-1788 (1925) in (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 414, 415.
"'I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 565; 3 BLACKSTONE, op. Cit. note 23, at 69.
6uSome question was raised as to the validity of the king's commission to the
judges, since they were not members of the Privy Council. Accordingly, 22 Gno.
II, c. 2 (1749) affimed the legality of the commission. The act, however, stipu-
lated that the commissioners could not give judgment unless a majority of those
present were Privy Councillors. 3 BLACKSTONE, Op. Cit. note 23, at 70. Cf. I
HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 565 n.
' i HOLDSWORTH, loc. cit. note 561. See note 267, supra.
$"See note 558, supra.
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b. Final Appellate Courts
Tim HousE oF LoR.Ds
The highest and final appellate court not only for the realm, but
for all Great Britain is the House of Lords.U5 It is more than an
appellate tribunal for the Lords are still, in theory, the king in his
Council in Parliament, and, as such, are vested with the entire
judicial function of the High Court of Parliament,50 which includes a
limited original criminal jirisdiction. 7 In its early days, the High
Court of Parliament shared with Chancery the administration of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of grace for the vindication of law and
order and in supplementing the inadequacies of the common law,58
which was later taken over for the most part by the Star Chamber.
5aPIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 291 et seg., 304; ADAMS, op. cit. note 174, at 455;
MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 473; 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 368.
6"The appellation, High Court of Parliament, accurately describes the me-
diaeval view that parliament in the sense of the king and his great Council was
primarily the highest and final court of justice of the realm. Indeed, until the
time of Elizabeth all determinations of parliament, whether in the form of legisla-
tive acts or judicial decisions, were referred to as the "judgments of parliament".
PLUCrNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 146; McILwAiN, op. cit. note 56, at 170; POLLARD,
A. P., THE EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT (1920) 24,36; BALDWIN, op. cit. note 50, at
321; SMITH, op. cit. note 294, at 55.
"71z ANsoN, op. cit. note 51o, at 383: "The appellate jurisdiction of the House of
Lords is doubtless a survival of a portion of the jurisdiction of the Curia Regis,
and of the time when a session of Parliaint was not easily distinguished from a
session of the Magnum Concilium." See also: ibid. 52; POLLARD, op. cit. note 566,
at 261, 310; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at z36, 213; BALDWIN, Op. cit. note 50, at
318; HALE, op. cit. note 370, at 58, 90; I HOLDswORTH, op. cit. note 2, at354 el seg.;
PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 289, 294-; CoKE's NINTH REPORT (circa z612) Preface.
The Commons, having been invited originally to meet with king and Council in
Parliament merely in an advisory capacity, never secured the right .of participa-
tion in the judicial function; that remained among the exclusive privileges vested
in the upper house which had formed part of the King's Council before Parliament
became a distinct organ of government in the late fourteenth century. Of the
Commons, MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 245, says: "In I HEN. IV (1399) they had
protested that they were not judges, and ... they had come to the conclusion
that they had no power to punish save for a contempt of their house." See I
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 362; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 133; PIKE, op.
cit. supra, at 289. Cf. COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 23; Hargrave, Preface to HALE'S
JURISDICTION OF THE LORD'S HOUSE (1796) lxxx ef seg.; HALE, op. cit. note 370, at
103, 127 et se.; MCILWAIN, op. cit. note 56, at 197 ef seg. 4!P P11
5MBMAWLANb, op. cit. note 5, at 216; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 366;
BALDWIN, op. cit. note 5o, at 224, 242; MCILWAIN, op. cit. note 56, at 117 et seg.;
HALE, op. cit. note 370, at III. But, as Lord Hale points out at page io9, after
the Council took over this extraordinary jurisdiction, the House of Lords lost all
power to give relief in cases not relievable in the ordinary courts of justice by
reason of defect in the law.
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After a conflict with the King's Council, the Lords in Parliament
late in the reign of Edward I1 (1326-1377) established their appellate
jurisdiction over the common law courts on the ground that only a
court of record could make a final judgment reversing the judg
ment of a court of record. 9 This appellate jurisdiction was exer-
cised in common law cases, both civil and criminal, by a writ of error
directed to the King's Bench, to the Exchequer Chamber, or to the
56BALDWIN, op. cit. note 50, at 335; 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 361;
PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 289; HALE, op. cit. note 370, at 96, I4O. Cf. McILwAIN,
op. cit. note 56, at 139, 234; COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 3, 4; MAY, Sir Thomas
Erskine, LAW AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT (1844) (7th ed. 1873) 103.
The question raised in note i8O, supra, as to whether the High Court of Parlia-
ment should be included among the prerogative courts does not seem to have been
specifically discussed.
Lord Hale, op. cit. note 370, at 134, says: "Though the Court of parliament
be the highest court of justice yet it is an extraordinary court.. ." Unquestion-
ably it originated as a prerogative court since it constituted the great council of
the king and administered the royal prerogative justice. See note 566, supra;
Hargrave, op. cit. note 567, at clxxxiii, ccxxii; PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 280. As
late as the declaration of parliamentary sovereignty in the Act of May 27, 1642,
the High Court of Parliament is described as not only a court of judicature but
also as a council. MCILwAIN, op. cit. note 56, at 389.
When the ancient council separated into the council in parliament and the
small council, and the former became a distinct court, it thereby acquired some of
the characteristics of a common-law court. Since the common-law judges origi-
nallysat as members of this greater council and always remained its advisers, they
seized upon the fact that it kept parliamentary rolls to recognize its supreme
appellate jurisdiction as against the rival council. Thereafter the House of Lords
apparently regarded itself as the protector and highest administrator of the
common-law. On the other hand, its method of trial before all the lords as judges
as in the ancient communal courts, and the fact that with respect to its jurisdic-
tion of privilege it administered a law of its own known as lex et consuetudo
parliamenti tend to defeat its status as a common law court. HALE, THE ORIGINAL
INSTITUTION, POWER AND JURISDICTION OF PARLIAMENTS (ed. 1707) 12 et seg.;
McILwAN, op. cit. note 56, at 236 el seg., 243; BALDWIN, op. Cit. note 5o, at 334,
343; CoxE, op. cit. note 7, at 14 (but cf. COKE, op. cit. note 567, at xii); Bridgman
v. Holt, SHOWER'S PARL. CASES (Loveland's ed. 1876) 143 (1693). (Cf. Rex &
Regina v. Knollys, I Lord Raymond's Rep. o [1694], which held the lex parlia-
menti to be the law of the realm.) It should also be noted that the House of Lords
was the only court in the classical English system which possessed appellate
jurisdiction both by writ of error from the common-law courts and by appeal from
the prerogative Court of Chancery, a fact which confirms its status as an extra-
ordinary court. Indeed, it was not until 1898 that this supreme appellate tribunal
decided that its own decisions on questions of law were binding on it as precedents.
I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 375.
At the close of the Westminster epoch, then, the House of Lords would seem
to have been neither a prerogative court nor a common-law court but a court sui
generis (of its own kind) dependent upon the sovereignty of parliament, rather
than on the crown, for much of both its original and appellate jurisdiction.
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common law side of Chancery.7 0 In the latter half of the seventeenth
century, the House of Lords on its own initiative extended its appel-
late jurisdiction to cover equity cases. They were brought up by a
petition of appeal from Chancery.57' This jurisdiction on appeal
came to embrace appeals from the equity side of the Exchequer, 72
from the Chancery Courts of the counties palatine7 8 and Ireland, 74
and from the courts of Scotland7" where a modified civil law system
prevails. The Lords failed, however, to vindicate their sweeping claim
that they possessed inherent authority to determine all appeals from
whatsoever courts, 76 for, as we shall see, the Privy Council before the
end of the Westminster epoch had established an independent appel-
late jurisdiction over admiralty and ecclesiastical appeals in England
and over all cases in law and equity from the dominions and possessions
beyond the seas. 7 7 The House of Lords continues to exercise its
appellate functions much the same today as it did at the close of the
common law era, although it came perilously near perishing with the
670PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 292 et seq.; PLUCENETT, op. cit. note 5, at 145;
COKE, op. cit. note 7, at 2I; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 370 et seq.; HALE,
op. cit. note 370, at 124, cited in i HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 371; POTTER,
op cit. note 9o, at 76. For the procedure in error in the House of Lords see MAc-
QUEEN, op. cit. note 421, at 361 et seg.; i HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra, at 37r;
HALE, op. cit. note 569, at 18 et seg.; HALE, op. cit. note 370, at 123 et seg.; 2
CHITTY, op. cit. note 236, at 597. And see note 525, supra.
The House of Lords also possessed power to grant writs of error in criminal
cases, but it was seldom used: PIKE, loc. cit. supra; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 59;
MACQUEEN, op. cit. supra, at 362; Hargrave, op. cit. note 567, at ccii n.
Error also lay to the King's Bench of Ireland and to the Irish House of Lords,
except for the period 1783-I80O, during which all appellate jurisdiction of the
House of Lords over Ireland was withdrawn by statute. Beven, Thomas, Appel-
late .Turisdicion of the House of Lords (goi) 17 L. Q. REv. 155, 357, at 361 et seg.;
PiKn, op. cit. note 528, at 3o. After 1707, error lay to the law side of the Court
of Exchequer in Scotland. 2 CmTTY, op. cit. note 236, at 595.
rThe Lords first reversed a decree of Chancery in I64O. i HOLDSWORTH, op.
cit. note 2, at 373 et se.; PiKE, op. cit. note 528, at 295 et seg.; Hargrave, op. cit.
note 567, at cxxxv et seg., clxi et seg.; HALE, op. cit. note 370, at Chap. 33.
InPIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 299; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 241.
OsPiKE, op. cit. note 528, at 304.
6741 STEPHEN, op. cit. note 3o8, at 57; I HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 375;
Beven, loc. cit. note 570; PIKE, op. cit. 528, at 3o3. Appeals from the Irish Free
State now go to the judicial Committee of the Privy Council. See note 653, infra.
Appeals from North Ireland, however, still lie to the House of Lords. i ANSON, op.
cit. note 5io, at 44; JENxs, op. cit. note 46, at 76.
6'T Beven, op. cit. note 570, at 363; PIRE, op. cit. note 528, at 300.
67 dHargrave, op. cit. note 567, at ccxxi.
roSee the history of the Privy Council, infra.
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celebrated courts of old at the general reorganization of the English
judicial system by the Judicature Acts.578
The Lord Chancellor, who acted as speaker of the House of Lords,
presided over appellate cases in the House of Lords,579 and until x844
each member of the House was a judge, as in the ancient communal
courts, whether learned in the law or not.580 In that year, the famous
'T 8The Act of 1873 abolished the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords,
but before that act went into effect on November i, 1875, the abolition was post-
poned for a year; and by the APPELLATE JURISDIcTION AcT of 1876, 39 & 40
VICT. c. 59, the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords was continued
with certain revisions. Among other improvements, this act substituted a
statutory petition of appeal for the common-law writ of error and the old
petition of appeal from Chancery. x HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 643 et
seg.; PiKE, op. cit. note 528, at 304 et seg.; 3 ANsoN, op. ct. note 5io, at 3O9.
And see note 713 infra.
Statutory appeal hasl argely superseded the writ of error in America, too. See
Compter, op. cit. note 547.
57 The Lord Chancellor when presiding in the House of Lords, like the presiding
official in the communal courts of old, had no vote as a judge unless he was also a
peer. Then he voted as such in order of his rank, the roll call always being from
lowest to highest. PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 210,354; x ANSON, op. cit. note 5io, at
241, 385; MACQUEEN, op. cit. 421, at 23 e seg.
Originally not all of the Lords were judges. HALE, op. cit. note 370, at I56,
states that in ancient times "the actual decision and determination ... was given
by a select number of lords and judges, nominated by the King in parliament or
at least by the king with the advice of the lords." CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 48,
places the beginning of the later practice at the Restoration.
5801 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 376. HALE, op. cit. note 37o , at 155,
criticized this system by which persons unlearned in the law had men's estates
and interests at their mercy, and judgments of learned judges given with great
deliberation and advice were subject to be overthrown by a single lay vote.
The Lords at one time even assumed the right to vote by proxy in judicial
cases, but the House put a stop to that in 1697 by a standing order that no proxy
should thereafter be used in any judicial cause before it. 6 SELDEN, Op. Cit. note
426, at 1641, Judicature in Parliament; MACQUEEN, op. cit. note 421, at 26.
Down to almost the middle of the nineteenth century any peer present seems to
have had the right to vote on the judgment whether he had heard the case or not.
In the famous O'Connell case the Lord Chancellor found it necessary to request
those who had not heard the entire argument to refrain from voting. Beven, op.
cit. note 57o, at 369.
In the New York Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of
Errors, the judges of which were chiefly senators unlearned in the law (see note 84,
supra), there seems to have been no requirement that only judges who had heard
the argument should participate in decisions. But beginning in 1841, the report
of each case expressly states that "all the members of the court present who had
heard the argument of the cause" voted. Delafield v. Illinois, 26 Wend. 192, 229
(N. Y., 1841). The Court existed from 1784 to 1846, and though sometimes as
many as thirty-seven members were entitled to sit thereon, twenty-nine is said
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case of Daniel O'Connell v. the Queen established that only the law
lords, those holding or who had held high judicial positions, should
vote as judges. This has become an established tradition and no
longer do the lay lords participate in cases on appeal.5"' The Lords do
not give a judgment in the way other courts do, but each law lord
orally addresses the House stating his decision on the case at bar
and the reasoning upon which he bases it. The determination of the
tribunal is entered in accord with the majority decision on the journal
of the House as part of its proceedings.5 8
Unfortunately, the attempt of Queen Victoria in 1856 to strengthen
the law lords by elevating celebrated judges to the peerage for life was
defeated when Baron Parke, the leading jurist of his day, was created
Lord Wensleydale and the Lords, in their exercise of their jurisdiction
of privilege, held that as a life peer he could neither sit norvotein the
House.5 m The Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876, however, provided
for the appointment of four Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who were
expressly empowered to sit and vote among the Lords, thus assuring
a distinguished bench in the supreme appellate court of the realm.
That act also provided that no appeal should be heard or determined
unless there'were present at least three "Lords of Appeal", namely,
the Lord Chancellor, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and such peers
as held or had once held high judicial office.
to be the highest number to participate in a decision. 2 CHESTER, Justice Alden,
COURTS AND LAWYERS OF NEw YoRK (1925) 796.
POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1928) 57, states
in an enumeration of the defects of legislative justice that "Legislators who have
not heard all the evidence have habitually participated in argument and decision;
and those who have not heard all the arguments have habitually taken part in the
decision."
58O'Connell v. the Queen, II Clark & Finnelly 155, 421 (1844). When in 1883
a lay lord attempted to vote, he was ignored. Beven, op. cit. note 570, at 370; I
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 377.
s2 LOWELL, A. Lawrence, GOVER MENT OF ENGLAND (1908) 399.
5The Wensleydale Peerage, 5 H. L. Cas. 958 (1856). A few months later the
crown conferred upon Lord Wensleydale, the life peer, an hereditary peerage,
whereupon he became entitled to sit and vote in the House of Lords. PIKE, op.
cit. note 528, at 378.'
584By this act the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were made barons for life but were
entitled to sit in the House of Lords only during their tenure of office. Appoint-
ments were restricted to those who had held high judicial office for two years or
had practiced as barrister or advocate at least fifteen years. The right of such a
life peer to sit and vote in the House of Lords was conferred for life by the APPEL-
LATE JURISDICTION AcT of 1887. Since 1913 there have been six Lords of Appeal in
Ordinary. See note 668, infra.
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Other Jurisdiction of the Lords
The House of Lords, as we have seen, administered an original
extraordinary jurisdiction both civil and criminal between subject and
subject up to the time of Henry V (1413-1422). This jurisdiction was
set in motion by petition to the king in his Council in Parliament. 585
Owing to the development of the prerogative through the centraliza-
tion of the governing power, first in the smaller Council about the
king and then under the Tudors in the monarch himself, the parliamen-
tary judicature lay dormant during the two centuries from 1413 to
1620.'8 Upon the resumption by Parliament of its judicial powers in
1621, the Lords again exercised both an original and an appellate
jurisdiction in civil and criminal causes until the abolition of the
House in 1649.587 In contrast to the monarchy, then tottering to its
doom, this newly revived supreme tribunal acquired a commanding
position, since upon the fall of the Star Chamber and High Commis-
sion in 1641, petitions for the extraordinary relief administered by
those courts were again addressed to the House of Lords as in ancient
days.18 8 So popular did it become in dispensing this extraordinary
jurisdiction that its overthrow met with strong opposition among the
ranks of the victorious Puritans."'
When the House of Lords was reinstated at the Restoration of i66o,
it resumed the broad original as well as appellate jurisdiction it had
wielded just before its fall. The Commons, however, vigorously
challenged the resumption of such an extensive original jurisdiction
by the Lords. In 1670 this claim of the Upper House was finally
58 BALDWiN, op. cit. note 5 o, at 323 et seq.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. c t. note 2, at
359; MCILWAIN, op. cit. note 56, at 203 et seg.
" The House of Lords could sit as a court only when Parliament was in session,
and the Tudors summoned infrequent and brief Parliaments. MACQuEEN, op.
cit. note 421, at 68o; McTLwAiN, op. cit. note 56, at 131 et seg.; POTTER, op. cit.
note 9o , at 74. By the APPELLATE JURISDICTIoN AcT, 39 & 40 VICT. C. 59, § 9
(1876), it was provided that the crown might authorize the Lords of Appeal to
hear appeals while Parliament was not in session.
$
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POLLARD, op. cit. note 566, at 309; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 366;
MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 316; POTTER, op. cit. note 90, at 75.
58 8Beven, op. cit. note 570, at 166 et seg.; I ANsoN, op. cit. note 51o, at 382;
PIKE, op. Cit. note 528, at 28r; POTTER, op. cit. note 9o, at 75.
The administrative courts of the Tudors had taken over much of the original
jurisdiction of the Lords. As Professor Pollard says, "The petitions which had
flowed in thousands to parliament were diverted to Chancery, the courts of star
chamber and requests, and other departments of the council." POLLARD, op. cit.
note 566, at 308, citing Hargrave, op. cit. note 567, at vi; MclLwAIW, op. cit. note
56, at 133; 1 LEADAm, op. cit. note 249, at xxiii-xxiv, lix-lx; BALDWIN, op. cit. note
50, at 243-249. 5 89Hargrave, op. cit. note 567, at lxviii et seq.
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defeated with respect to original civil jurisdiction between subject
and subject when the House of Lords attempted, at the request of the
king, to take cognizance of the case of Skinner v. East India Company.9 0
It is significant that the Commons ventured to join issue with the
Lords in this case since it fell within the ancient extraordinary juris-
diction, as it involved injury to and dispossession of an East Indian
island held by the plaintiff, a wrong for which the English Courts
afforded no remedy because under the orthodox common law doctrine
of venue it was a local action to be tried where the land lay.5 91 An
indirect effect of this decision was the termination, also, of the Lords'
claim to function again as a court of first instance in criminal cases
against commoners.19 They preserved, however, their jurisdiction
59OHoLLIs, Baron, THE GRAND QUESTION CONCERNING THE JUDICATURE OF THE
HOUSE OF PEERS, STATED AND ARGUED (1669); 6 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 7IO
(z666); Pike, op. cit. note 528, at 281; Hargrave, op. cit. note 567, at ev et seg.; I
HOLDSWORTH, op. ctr. note 2, at 367; I ANSON, op. cit. note 5io, at 381; Beven, op.
t. note 570, at x69.
' 91The East India Company petitioned the Commons for relief from this
"usurpation" of original civil jurisdiction by the Lords. The Commons denied
the jurisdiction of the Lords as to Skinner's allegations of injury to person and
property on the ground such actions were transitory and, therefore, the ordinary
courts of law afforded a remedy. They ignored the fact that Skinner had no
remedy at law or in equity with respect to the injury to the real estate. Under
the doctrine of venue all actions for injuries to land and immovables were "local"
and had to be brought in the courts of the place where the injury occurred. Ac-
tions for injuries to the person or to movables were "transitory" and could be
brought in any court within whose territorial jurisdiction the defendant could be
found and served with its process. See citation of authorities, note 469, supra.
0t2The remaining criminal jurisdiction of the Lords over causes such as impeach-
ment and privilege is not ousted simply because the defendant is a commoner.
x HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 379; I ANSON, op. cit. note 51o, at 386; CARTER,
op. cit. note 68, at 66.
In z663 the Lords had imposed a fine and imprisonment beyond the sitting of
Parliament upon one Fitton and a certain William Carr, for libelling Lord Gerard
of Brandon. Imprisonment beyond the session of Parliament was an illegal
punishment for breach of privilege: the case must, therefore, have been one of
original -criminal jurisdiction. The Commons protested vigorously, but chose to
make an issue rather of the Skinner case, which displaced the other in popular
interest. Hargrave, op. cit. note 567, at xcix et seg. In 1693 the Duchess of
Grafton by petition to the Lords charged the three puisne judges of the King's
Bench with crime; the justices answered to the petition that the Lords had no
original jurisdiction over the cause as, being a criminal charge, it was only triable
by the due course of the common law and not by this extraordinary procedure.
After the case had been argued before them, the Lords "gave permission" to the
Duchess to withdraw her petition. Bridgman v. Holt, SHOWER'S PARLIAMENTARY
CASES (Loveland's ed. 1876) i43 (1693); Hargrave, op. cit. supra, at clxxxv et seg.
This voluntary renunciation of the disputed jurisdiction by the Lords settled a
grave constitutional question.
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over cases of privilege, that is, those involving the validity of the
creation of new peerages (with reference to the right to sit and vote)
or of claims to old ones,sss and the right to punish contempt of their
House 14
The House of Lords also retains an important original criminal
jurisdiction in two types of cases: (i) trial of peers for treason and
felonies,159 and (2) trial of public officials or other subjects im-
peached for crime by the House of Commons.5" The jurisdiction
of the upper house over treason and felony of peers goes back to the
thirty-ninth clause of Magna Carta-that no freeman should be
exiled or in any way destroyed except by lawful judgment of his
peers and / or by the law of the land.597 With the transition from a
created peerage to an hereditary peerage, this clause was construed to
guarantee to an hereditary peer accused of treason or felony a trial
by hereditary lords.5 98
The procedure in such cases begins by indictment of the accused
'Ili HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 391; 22 HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at 277
et seg.
'"I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 391; HALE, op. cit. note 370, at 84. For an
historical review of the right of a legislative body to punish for contempt of its
power of investigation into public affairs, see Landis, James M., Constitutional
Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation (1926) 40 HARv. L. REv.
153.
596HARcouRT, Leveson William Vernon, His GRACE, THE STEWARD, AND TRIAL
BY PEERS (1907); I HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 385 et seg.; CARTER, Op. Cit.
note 68, at 61 et seg.; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 169 et seg.; SELDEN, op. cit.
note 580, Chap. 1; POTTER, op. cit. note go, at 76. An interesting twentieth cen-
tury instance of trial by peers was that of Earl Russell for bigamy which resulted
in a plea of guilty by the defendant. [igoi ] A. C. 446, s. c. SCOTT, James Brown,
CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vance ed. 1922) 371. Lord Chancellor Hasbury
presided as Lord High Steward, and about one hundred sixty peers acted as
judges. Eleven justices attended as advisers. 6"See note 6o6, infra.
607i POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. note 2, at 173, 410; 1 HoLDswORTH, op.
cit. note 2, at 385,.39o; I MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 169 et seg. The thirty-ninth
clause is quoted in full in note 298, supra. See POLLARD, op. cit. note 566, at 86, 91,
and McKEcHNiE, William Sharp, MAGNA CARTA (1914) 375 et seq.
"'The privilege extends to all peers, even those disqualified from sitting in the
House; to peeresses by marriage; and, since the Unions of 17o6 and I8oo, to peers
of Scotland and to peers of Ireland. It does not apply to the widow of a peer who
has married a commoner, nor to spiritual lords, nor to Irish peers while members
of the House of Commons. The privilege of trial by the House cannot be waived:
22 HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at 271 ef seg.; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 62; I
LOWELL, op. cit. note 582, at 399. Cf. PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 215, 221, 227:
"Infants, aliens, bankrupts, and persons under sentence for grave offenses, are
incapable of sitting in the House of Lords." I LOWELL, op. cit. supra, at 398.
Peers charged with misdemeanors are tried in the ordinary criminal courts.
CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 62.
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peer in the ordinary criminal courts and removal of the case into the
House of Lords for trial by Writ of Certiorari to Review.590 The Lord
Chancellor, as such, does not preside over these trials as he does over
all other cases before the Upper House, for there was a time when he
might not be of the hereditary peerage. Instead, the king appoints
from among the hereditary temporal lords a Lord High Steward to
preside for the occasion.'1 ' Now that for two centuries it has been
customary for the Lord Chancellor to be raised to the peerage on his
assumption of office,60' he is generally appointed to preside as Lord
High Steward.
If Parliament is in session, the trial is before the House of Lords as
such, though technically called the Court of our Lord the King in
Parliament, and all the temporal hereditary peers present are judges
much as in the Curia Regis of old.6 0 If not, the trial is said to be in
the Court of the Lord High Steward and he sits as sole judge of law
and practice assisted by a jury of peers known as the Lords Triers.6n
Originally, only peers specially summoned could sit as Lords Triers,
the usual number being twenty-three, and their verdict must be
unanimous.10s As this enabled the crown to obtain a packed jury, a
change was made in i696, whereby even in trials in the Lord High
Steward's Court all the temporal peers are summoned, and the ver-
dict is by majority vote of all peers present subject to the limitation
that at least twelve must con6ur in a vote to convict.
60 5
5'"4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 262; x HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 390;
I STEPHEN, op. cit. note 439, at 165. See note 162, supra.
"TiP1KE, op. cit. note 528, at 209 et seq.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 388;
CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 62.
601POLLARD, op. cit. note 566, at 251, says: "The anomaly of having a lord chan-
cellor to preside over a house in which he 'had no interest to give any assent or
dissent' was gradually removed by the practice of creating the lord chancellor a peer,
though the rule did not become invariable until after the reign of QueenAnne."
InPiKE, op. cit. note 528, at 227, 3o6; 4 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 263; I
AITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 136; I ANSON, op. cit. note 5io, at 245; I HOLDS-
WORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 386, 389.
613in a trial before the whole House the Lords Spiritual, while entitled to partic-
ipate as judges, always withdrew before the sentence, for the canons of the
Church, and the Constitutions of Clarendon, prohibited them from taking part in
a judgment entailing shedding of blood, and formerly these trials for treason and
felony usually involved capital punishment upon conviction. For this reason
Lords Spiritual were not summoned as Lords Triers in the Court of the Lord
High Steward.
61I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 389 et seg.; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 62;
MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 170.
"'7 WiL. III, (x689-1702) c. 3, § 11. Cf. i HOLDSWORTH, op. ct. note 2, at 389-
390.
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The second instance of survival of the Lords' original criminal
jurisdiction is the trial of those persons, usually public officials, who
have been impeached by the Commons for high crimes and mis-
demeanors.10 This jurisdiction extended to both peer and commoner,
but though still available it has not been exercised since the impeach-
ment of Lord Melville, in 18o5.607 Impeachment was formerly the
chief instrument by which the Commons could bring pressure upon
the crown through the ministers of state,6 8 for it was a criminal
prosecution neither instituted nor controlled by the king but solely
by the House of Commons, which not only brought the indictment
but also appeared as prosecutor before the Lords.609 The accused was
furnished with a copy of the articles of impeachment and an oppor-
tunity to defend. The usual form of criminal trial before all the
lords followed. Even though a majority voted for conviction, no
sentence could be imposed unless the Commons formally demanded
judgment.610 The crown's pardon was no bar to a trial of impeach-
ment,6 1 but after sentence the ordinary criminal law attached and the
crown could then pardon.6 1
Since the chief object of impeachments was to remove unpopular
officials, particularly ministers of the crown, and it was often impos-
6064 HATSELL, John, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COM-
MONS (1796) 5o et seq.; I ANSON, op. ct. note 51o, at 384 et seg.; I HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. note 2, at 379 et seg.; I STEPHEN, op. cit. note 439, at 145 et seq.; 6 SELDEN,
op. cit. note 426, at 1592 et seg.; PLUCKNETT, op. cit. note 5, at 146; HALE, op. Cit.
note 37o, at 101. The procedure in impeachment prescribed in Article One of the
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION was adapted from and parallels almost exactly
the familiar English practice. BURDICK, op. cit. note 623, at 85 et seq.
607"The parliament, that is to say, the lords, had gradually abandoned all
attempt to act as a court of first instance in criminal or civil cases, save when a
peer was to be tried for felony or treason-but to this there was one great excep-
tion. They had entertained accusations both against peers and against common-
ers when preferred by the commons. Such accusations preferred by the commons
to the lords came to be known as impeachments." MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at
215. And see CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 65; PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 228. Lord
Melville was impeached for misconduct as Treasurer of the Navy, but he was
acquitted. Fraser, J. A. Lovat, Te Impeachment of Lord Melille (1913) 24
JURIDICAL REV. 235. The first impeachment in England occurred in 1376.
P=KE, op. 4i. supra, at 205; I HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 380.
s603-AITL,, D, op. cit, note 5, at 215; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 381; I
STEPHEx, op. cit. note 439, at 158 ef seg.; PROTHERO, Op. cit. note 169, at lxxxv.
6094 HATSELL, op. cit. note 6o6, at 62 et seq.; I ANSON, op. cit. note 51, at 385,
386; MAITLAND, loc cit. note 607, supra; McTLwAIN, op. cit. note 56, at 187 et seq.
6101 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 379; I ANsON, op. cit. note 51o, at 386.
6"It was so decided in Danby's Case, I I HOwELL'S STATE TRIALS 599, 790 et
seg. (1678-x683), and this ruling was incorporated in the AcT OF SETTLEMENT, 12
& 13 WIL. III, C. 2, § 3 (17oo). 6121 ANSON, loc. cit. note 61o, supra.
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sible to prove commission of crime,""1 this method of criminal pro-
cedure fell into disuse in England with the advent of the cabinet
system of government, under which a vote of want of confidence by
the Commons is immediately followed by resignation of the entire
ministry. 14 By statute an address to remove a judge has been
substituted for impeachment of the judiciary.616
The House of Lords also exercised a kind of original criminal
jurisdiction in respect to the nefarious bill of attainderwhich flourished
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the royal engine of
political vengeance. Unlike the impeachment, it originated in the
upper house, and took the form of a legislative enactment requiring
concurrence of Commons, Lords and Crown.616 The attainted person
was thus deprived of life and property by the mere passage of a
statute without trial or hearing and though guilty of no act previ-
ouslyrecognized to be a crime. Tocondemnwithout trial and perhaps
for an act made a crime ex post facto is so abhorrent to the sense of
justice that attainder has not been resorted to in England since 696,
although under the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy the possi-
bility of attainder is not extinct.617 The bills of rights of our Ameri-
can constitutions expressly safeguard us from such enactments.
The House of Lords came to share with the Commons an anomalous
civil jurisdiction with respect to semi-judicial private statutes. The
early petitions to Parliament for extra-judicial relief in specific cases,
613The trial of Warren Hastings, a retired governor-general of India, who was
impeached on charges of corruption, extortion and misgovernment, lasted from
1788 to 1795, and terminated in an acquittal. The trial is graphically described
by Lord Macaulay in his essay on Warren Hastings.
614The doctrine of Cabinet responsibility to the Commons originated in the
eighteenth century and was firmly established during the reign of Victoria.
MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 396 et seQ.; I ANSON, Op. cit. note 510, at 402; I
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 384. Cf. ADAMS, op. cit. note 174, at 289.
esSuPREmE COURT OF JUDIcATURE AcT, 15 & 16 GEO. 5, c. 49, § 12 (1) (1925):
"All the judges of the High Court and of the Court of Appeal, with the exception
of the Lord Chancellor, shall hold their offices during good behaviour subject to a
power of removal by His Majesty on an address presented to His Majesty by
both Houses of Parliament."
Originally all the judges lost their commissions on the demise of the sovereign.
6 ANNE c. 7, § 8 (1707) provided that they should hold office for six months after
the death of the crown; I GEo. III, c. 23 (176o), provided that they should con-
tinue in office unaffected by the demise of the sovereign. I HOLDSWORTH, Op. Cit.
note 2, at 195.
6164 HATSELL, op. cit. note 6o6, at 77 el seQ.; I ANSON, op. cit. note 5io, at 381,
388; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 215; CARTER, op. cit. note 68, at 67; PIlE, op.
cit. note 528, at 336; McILwAIN, op. cit. note 56, at i50 et seg.
617MAITLA D, op. cit. note 5, at 319.
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gradually took the form of legislative bills, usually introduced in the
House of Commons to be enacted into private statutes. 18 Among
these were the bills for divorce a vinculo matrimonii by special act of
parliament, 619 which were first presented in the upper house. Such
a bill if passed by the Lords after a legislative hearing, was trans-
mitted to the lower house, which might rehear the cause or take
additional testimony before concurring in the act of divorce.2 0 As
we have seen, both ecclesiastical and parliamentary divorce were
abolished upon creation of the Court of Divorce in 1857. 621 To this
day in many types of claims the private statute remains the only way
a person injured by the sovereign can get redress either in England or
in the United States except so far as the sovereign has consented by
general or special acts to be sued in its ordinary courts2 or in a per-
manent Court of Claims.62 3 The House of Lords participates in this
type of jurisdiction in its normal legislative capacity, but, as Mc-
61 8McILwAIN, op. cit. note 56, at 219; MAY, op. cit. note 569, at 681 el seq.;
I LowELL, op. cit. note 582, at 367 el seg.
6"See note 423, supra.
6-
0MACQUEEN, op. cit. note 421, at 510 et seq.
6uSee note 429, supra. By 31 & 32 VICT. c. 77 (x868) an appeal lay from the
Court of Divorce to the House of Lords. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 624.
6"I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. cit. note 2, at 182; Barry, Herbert, The King
Can Do No Wrong (1925) 1I VA. L. Rav. 349; Borchard, Edwin M., Governmental
Liability in Tori, Parts I-VIII (1924-1925) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229; (1926-
1927) 36 ibid. 1, 757, 1039; (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 577, 734; Maguire, John M.,
State Liability for Tort (1916) 3o HARV. L. REV. 20; WATiINS, Robert D., TEn
STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT (1927).
Compare The English Petition of Right (petition de droit), or the plea of right
(monstrans de droit), which afforded relief to the subject in spite of the doctrine
of immunity of the sovereign from suit: Laski, Harold J., Responsibility of the
State in England (1919) 32 HARv. L. REV. 447,455; I BLACKSTONE, op. cit note 23,
at 243; 3 ibid. 254-257; PLUCKNETT, Op. cit. note 5, at 6o.
esBURDICK, Charles K., LAw OF THE AxERicAN CONSTITUTION (1923) § 47;
Crane, Judson A., Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Claims (1920) 34 HARv.
L. REv. 16I; MacDonald, John W., Substantive Liability of the State of New York
(1929) i N. Y. S. B. Ass'N BULL. 235.
The United States has accepted liability in the courts of the United States or
abroad in an action in personam, but not in rem, with respect to merchant vessels
owned by it, or by a corporation of which it holds all the shares, Title 46, U. S. C.
A. §§ 742, 747. This acceptance of liability to suit in personam was extended to
public vessels of the United States, such as war ships, by § 781.
The United States Court of Claims has jurisdiction only of claims arising out of
contract expressed or implied in fact and not of those based upon quasi-contracts
[Pearson v. U. S., 267 U. S. 423, 45 Sup. Ct. 24o, 69 L. Ed. 694 (1925)] or tort.
Cf. Collins v. Commonwealth, 262 Pa. 572, xo6 Atl. 229 (I919), holding that
under Constitution of 1874 the state could give its consent to be sued only by
general laws.
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lwain points out, many of the rules relating to such acts indicate
their essentially semi-judicial nature.124
The pressing question of American adherence to the World Court
protocol, now before our country,H has focused attention upon the
ancient function of the English common law judges in rendering ad-
visory opinions to the House of Lords on both judicial andlegislative
questions.6 2 Originally, as we have seen, the judges sat as members
of the early King's Council and participated in its decisions.6 27 But
later, when the right to participate in the great council in parliament
became hereditary, the judges, since they acquired their positions by
professional qualifications and not by. blood, degenerated in power and
prestige, until they became mere assistants in the exercise of its
judicature, and advisersP15 to the untrained nobles who had arrogated
to themselves the ultimate authority of the realm on questions of law
and equity.2 9 Though the situation in the House of Lords has been
greatly improved by.the provision for Lords of Appeal, the English
judiciary may still be called upon for advisory opinions. Seven of the
American states"'have followed this procedure by providing that the
M CILWAIN, op. cit. note 56, at 222 et seg.
6uThe fourteenth article of the LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT imposes upon
the Permanent Court of International Justice, the so-called World Court, the duty
of rendering advisory opinions to the Council of the League of Nations upon the
request of that body. Moore, John Bassett, The Permanent Court of International
Justice (April, 1924) INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, No. 197, 103 et seg.; PEPPER,
George Wharton, IN THE SENATE (1930) io9; HUDSON, Manley 0., THE WORLD
COURT (1931) 63 et seg., 187 ef seg.
The advisory opinion of the World Court, declaring illegal the Austro-German
customs union, is discussed in Davis, John W., The World Court Settles the Question
(Jan., 1932) r49 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 119.
GEMAY, op. cit. note 569, at 54, 233; MACQUEEN, op. cit. note 421, at 35; MAIT-
LAND, op. cit. note 5, at 84; BALDWIN, op. cit. note 5o, at 77; PIKE, op. cit. note
528, at 246; POLLARD, op. cit. note 566, at 293,294; BURDICK, op. cit. note 623, at 134.
62BALDWiN, op. cit. note 50, at 77, 312; PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 47, 195, 247-
6 8PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 247; I HOLDSWORTH, op. Cit. note 2, at 376; POL-
LARD, op. cit. note 566, at 250; CoKE, op. cit. note 7, at 4. HALE, op. cit. note 370,
at i59, says of the judges: "[T]hough for many years last past they have had only
voices of advice and assistance not authoritative or decisive; yet their opinions
have been always the rules, whereby the Lords do or should proceed in matters
of law, especially between party and party: unless the cases be so momentous,
that they are not fit for the determination of judges; as in questions touching the
right of succession of the crown or the privileges of parliament."
629POLLARD, op. cit. note 566, at 3o8 et seg., ridicules the peers as a court of ap-
peal. Accord: HALE, op. cit. note 370, at 158, 200; I HOLDSWORTII, op. cit. note 2,
at 376. Cf. PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 388 et seg.
"'Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
South Dakota. See I THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895) 175.
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highest appellate court shall render advisory opinions to the legisla-
tive or executive departments on request, but in general such service
is rendered by the attorney-general of the state. 3'
THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council today exercises, as it
did at the close of the Westminster epoch, an appellate jurisdiction
not only over the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and the British
colonies and dependencies, but also over the ecclesiastical courts of
England and all British consular and other extraterritorial courts.H
This body, which is also known as "the Board", is probably the
greatest appellate tribunal in the history of the world. Not only does
it pass upon the validity of legislation in the far flung British Common-
wealth of Nations, but in the exercise of its world-wide jurisdiction
it is required to administer Roman-Dutch law, French law, Moham-
medan law and the English common law as adopted in the various
British dominions.63  In the words of Professor Holdsworth, "...
the Judicial Committee itself is now doing for the Empire somewhat
the same service as the Curia Regis formerly did for England."18 4
This appellate jurisdiction of the Privy Council over the British
possessions abroad illustrates how deeply rooted may be some of our
present day institutions. It is directly traceable to the historical
accident that the Channel Islands formed part of the duchy of Nor-
mandy and were brought under the English crown by the Conquer-
or.1 They have never been regarded as part of the realm of England
but still possess their own systems of laws and courts. These islands,
therefore, appealed to the king of England as their direct overlord,
and he heard such appeals, as he did English petitions, in his Great
Council in Parliament. 36 With the separation of the Smaller Coun-
cil about the king from the ancient Council in Parliament, this
jurisdiction over appeals from the possessions beyond the realm re-
mained in the crown. Until the time of the Tudors, the king at the
MI WILLOUGHBY, Westel Woodbury, THE CONSTITUTiONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) § 18; PEPPER, op. cit. note 625, at 1o8.
2 LOWELL, op. cit. note 582, at 465; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 52 et
seg.; 9 HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at 28 et seq.
LMMiTLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 340; 2 LOWELL, op. cit. note 582, at 466; i
HOLDSWORTH, loc. cit. note 632.
Guz HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. note 2, at 523.
mg HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at 3I; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 520;
PIKE, op. cit. note 528, at 307.
6 38MACQUEEN, op. cit. note 42I, at 6,677; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 520;
CARTER, op. cit. note 41, at 126.
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beginning of each parliament appointed "triours" or "auditores" in
parliament to hear such appeals.3 7 These triers were practically
always judges of the king's courts who were also members of the
Smaller or Privy Council.
The eclipse of the parliamentary judicature by the rehabilitated
King's Council under the early Tudors placed such a burden of
administrative detail on that body that Henry VIII formed an inner
or executive branch of the Council to which we have previously
referred as the "Council Attendant".6"" This compact and efficient
group of professional and experienced advisers was composed chiefly
of knights and commoners, headed by a new high official, the Secre-
tary of State, and a few of the principal crown ministers.6 9 To this
Council of advisers the king transferred the exercise of his personal
appellate jurisdiction over the crown possessions beyond the realm
and many other important functions.60 About 1540 this latest and
most influential branch of the Council began to assume the character
of a distinct appendage to the throne and gradually it came to be
known as the Privy Council as distinguished from the mediaeval
Council-the concilium ordinarium. Owing to the fact that privy
councillors were soon promoted to sit of right on the older Council,
the two councils were popularly identified with each other and with
the mediaeval privy council down to the Commonwealth.61 The act
of 1641 which abolished the Star Chamber did not purport to take
away the appellate jurisdiction of the Privy Council.6 In 1667,
following the Restoration, a committee of the Privy Council was
appointed to hear appeals from the Channel Islands and in 1696 this
was extended to include appeals from any of the colonial planta-
tions.64 Such appeals were granted by the king not of right but of
grace in the exercise of the ancient prerogative of justice.644
1'MACQUEEN, loc. cit. note 636; BALDwIN, op. cit. note 50, at 323; IO HALs-
BURY, op. cit. note 357, at 579n. "'6See note 284, supra.
1
9DicEy, op. cit. note i93, at 84 et seg.; POLLARD, op. cit. note 276, at 34o et
seg.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 492; BALDWIN, op. cit. note 50, at 446 et
seg.; BEARD, op. cit. note 89, at 115.
64OAs early as 1495, however, Henry VII had provided by Order in Council
that appeals from the Channel Islands should be heard in Council. Elizabeth
made similar provision in 1565. I HOLDsWoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 520-521;
BALDWIN, op. cit. note 5o , at 454- Cf. MACQUEEN, op. cit. note 42I, at 686.
64See Hudson, op. cit. note 182, at 24, 62; BALDWIN, op. cit. note 5o , at 448.
M4 Dcmy, LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION(Ig]5) 376; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at462.
Mi HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 516, 522; I BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at
231.
611 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 522; KERR, Donald, LAw OF THE AUSTRA-
LIAN CONSTITUTION (1925) 291.
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The nineteenth century saw a marked development in this appel-
late jurisdiction of the Privy Council. When the High Court of
Delegates was abolished in 1832, the Privy Council succeeded to its
appellate jurisdiction over the ecclesiastical and admiralty causes." 5
In 1833 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was created by
statute, to take over the judicature of the Council, as well as the
power of review formerly vested in the Admiralty and in the Com-
missioners in Prize Cases.64 When the Court of Admiralty was
merged into the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
igh Court of Justice by the Judicature Act of 1873, the Privy Coun-
cil lost the review of admiralty causes, except appeals from the
Prize Court.64
By the Judicial Committee Act of 1844, Parliament gave statutory
recognition to the prerogative authority of that committee to hear
appeals from any court of justice of the British colonies and posses-
sions.6 8 Later acts of parliament creating the various dominion
governments have tended to limit such appeals to those from the
highest courts of the several provinces or states of the respective
dominions," 9 or from the dominion court of final jurisdiction. In
62 & 3 WIL. IV, C. 92, and see notes 390, 558, supra. In the same year the
Privy Council was given power to hear appeals from England and Ireland in
cases of idiocy and lunacy. 2 & 3 WIL. IV, c. 4, § 3. It had already exercised this
power for a century. i BLACKSTONE, op. cit. note 23, at 231; MACQUEEN, oP. cit.
note 421, at 753.
6"3 & 4 W r. IV, c. 41. The effect of the statute is fully discussed in MAc-
QUEEN, op. cit. note 421, at 687 et seg. Also see: I HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at
518; DIcEY, op. cit. note 193, at z44.
"7THE NAVAL PR=E ACT, 27 & 28 VICT. c. 25 (1864) expressly declared that the
Judicial Committee should hear appeals from the Prize Court. As a result of the
judicature Acts there was much doubt as to where appeals in prize cases lay;
consequently, it was enacted by 54 & 55 VIcT. c. 53 (i891) that the High Court of
Justice constituted a prize court, in which prize cases were to be heard in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, from which appeals lay to the Judicial
Committee, in accordance with the NAVAL PRizE ACT. In theory an appeal still
lies to the Privy Council from the Admiralty Court of the CinquePorts, forwhich
see note 451, supra. 9 HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at 28; Mears, op. cit. note 442,
at 315 n.
"87 & 8 VicT. c. 69. Section i of the act concludes: "Provided also, that nothing
herein contained shall be construed to extend to take away or diminish any power
now by law vested in her Majesty for regulating appeals to her Majesty in council
from the judgments, sentences, decrees, or orders of any courts of justice within
any of her Majesty's colonies or possessions abroad."
"'5 his is not true of the Union of South Africa where leave to appeal may only
be granted with respect to appeals from the highest court of the Union and not
from the several colonial appellate courts. The Colonial Conferences 1907, and
1911, favored this rule denying right to appeal to the Privy Council not only
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general, appeals from the provincial courts are taken as of right if
they fall within the provisions of certain Orders of the King in Coun-
cil but from the dominion courts only by special leave of the Judicial
Committee.1"0 Australia has secured the greatest autonomy in this
respect, for under its constitution there is no right to appeal to the
Privy Council on constitutional questions or disputes between the
Australian states except upon the certificate of the High Court of the
Commonwealth."' Wherever leave of the Judicial Committee is
required, as in appeals from the High Court of Australia, the Supreme
Court of Canada,6 2 the Supreme Court of the Irish Free State,"" or
from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the Union of
South Africa,6 4 it will be granted only in cases presenting important
legal questions, or affecting substantial property interests, or involv-
ing issues of public significance.6" While the Judicial Committee
still retains its jurisdiction over criminal appeals as well as over civil
appeals, there is a distinct policy against hearing such appeals unless
they present questions of gross injustice or of public importance.6"
from courts of first instance as may be done in Quebec and in a lesser degree in
Ontario, but also from the provincial courts of appeal, and the substitution
therefor of appeal only from the supreme appellate court of the dominion. CAM-
ERON, Edward Robert, THE CANADIA CoNsnITUTioN (1915) 40 et $eq. The Im-
perial Conferences of 1923, 1926 and 193o did not make any change in this
situation.
eaHuGHES, Hector, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND JUDICIAL AuToNowY IN THE
BRiTisH ComMoNwEALT Or NATIONS (1931) 20 et seg.; KEITH, Arthur Berrie-
dale, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE BRITisn DOmINIONS (1929) 256; MOORE, W. Harrison,
COmmONwEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (1902) 249 et seg.; WHEELER, Gerald John,
CONFEDERATION LAW OF CANADA (1896) 396. Admiralty appeals are the only
ones which lie of right from the Supreme Court of Canada to the Privy Council.
I CAMERON, op. cit. note 649, at 23.
51 KERR, op. cit. note 644, at 294; KEITH, loc. cit. note 650; MOORE, op. cit. note
650, at 247; I HOLDswORTu, op. cit. note 2, at 522.
60KEITH, loc. cit. note 6.0; MooRE, oc. cit. note 651; I CAMERON, op. cit. note
649, at 22.
WIRisH FREE STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 66; 5 HALSBURY, Op. cit. note 170,
at 648; KEITH, op. cit. note 65o, at 59.
u'KEITH, op. cit. note 650, at 257, says that the Judicial Committee has granted
very few appeals from South Africa, owing to the difficulty the Committee has in
reviewing Roman Dutch law.
The right to appeal from New Zealand and Newfoundland is likewise without
legal restriction, but is rarely exercised. KEITH, Zoc. cit. supra.
"'Prince v. Gagnon, 8 App. Cas. Io3 (1883); I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at
523; MooRE, op. cit. note 650, at 249.
6 Nadan v. The King [1926] A. C. 482, also reported in 2 CAMERON, op. it.
note 649, at 400; Arnold v. the King-Emperor [1914] A. C. 644; Armstrong v.
The King, 30 T. L. R. 215 (I913); io HALsuRY, op. cit. note 357, at 581; KEITH,
op. cit. note 65o, at 256; I HOLDswoRTH, op. cit. note 2, at 523.
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Appeals to the Privy Council take the form of appeals to His
Majesty the King in Council. Since in theory the Judicial Com-
mittee is not a court, it does not hand down a judgment of its own,
but simply reports to the King in Council, advising that the appeal in
the particular case be allowed or dismissed. Thereupon this is made
the final action of the King in Council by his Majesty's so adjudging
in his own name . 57 The Committee also differs from the House of
Lords in not being bound by its own precedents, at least with respect
to opinions given ex parte (in non-contested cases), 65s and also in
announcing its decisions without disclosure as to dissents.
6 59
The King in Council, as feudal sovereign, exercises original juris-
diction over cases involving royal grants to lands in overseas posses-
sions and over disputes between colonies or dependencies of the
crown.00 For the past century the crown has exercised this original
prerogative jurisdiction by referring such cases to the Judicial Com-
mittee pursuant to provision therefor in the Act of 1833.161 The most
recent instance of original judicature is In re Labrador Boundary,1
2
in which the Judicial Committee determined that under various
statutes, orders in council, and royal proclamations the coast of
Labrador belonged to the Colony of Newfoundland rather than to the
Province of Quebec.
The jurisdiction of the Privy Council was exercised prior to 1833
by small committees of the Council composed chiefly of those mem-
bers who had held high judicial office.6 63 The increasing importance
of the colonial litigation demanded a more systematic organization of
what was in truth the colonial court of last resort.6 14 To meet this
657 MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 463; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 520, 523;
IO HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at 579. It should be remembered that the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council is historically a committee of an executive council
rather than a true court. POLLARD, op. cit. note 566, at 238; I HOLDSWORTH, Op.
cit. note 2, at 519.
"OTooth v. Power [i891 ] A. C. 284, 292. See io HALSBURY, op. cit. note 357, at
58o; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 519. As to the Houseof Lords, see note 569,
supra.
69i HoLDSWORTir, loc. cit. note 658; MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 463.
601 BLAcxsToNE, op. cit. note 23, at 231. The Imperial Conference of 1930
recommended legislation by Parliament providing for settlement of disputes
between the dominions of the British Commonwealth of Nations by Arbitral
tribunals created to deal with each case as it arises. See Tnn BRiTIsH YEAR Boor
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (i93i) I44.
"'3 & 4 WIL. IV, c. 41, § 4. "243 T. L. R. 289 (1927).
6""[E]ach of these smaller committees was regarded as the committee for
appeals from the Plantations, which was in substance, a committee of the whole
Council." I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 517.
6"MAITLAND, op. cit. note 5, at 463.
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need the Act of 1833 established the Judicial Committee of the
Council as a permanent committee of appeal and carefully defined its
membership. Under that Act the Committee included the Lord
President of the Council, and those members who held or had held
high judicial office, 66 with power in the crown to direct the attendance
of the judges of the superior courts. Four members of the Committee
were to constitute a quorum.66 Subsequent legislation empowered
the crown to appoint four paid members of the Board from among the
judges of the superior courts,66 7 but the four Lords of Appeal in
Ordinary in the House of Lords later succeeded by statute to -these
paid judgeships.65  Just after the close of the Westminster epoch it
seemed likely that the two great branches of English appellate judica-
ture, since they were manned by practically the same personnel,
would merge into a single supreme appellate court, for the law lords
of Parliament were usually privy councillors and, as such, members of
the Judicial Committee of the Council.66 The turn of the century,
however, witnessed the beginning of a new development in the
opposite direction. 67 0 By a series of parliamentary enactments, 67' the
Board has gradually been made representative of the world-wide
mThe Act of 1833 designated those judicial officials who should serve on the
Committee as follows: the President of the Privy Council, the Lord Chancellor of
Great Britain and those members of the Council who held these offices: Lord Keep-
er or First Lord Commissioner of the Great Seal of Great Britain, the chief justice
and judges of the three superior courts of law, the Master of the Rolls, the Vice
Chancellor, the judge of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, judge of the High
Court of Admiralty and the chief judge of the Bankruptcy Court, together with
all members who previously had held any of the judicial offices named.
The phrase "high judicial office" appears in the APPELLATE JURISDICTION ACT
of 1876, § 25 (39 & 40 VICT. c. 59), where it is defined to mean "the office of Lord
Chancellor of Great Britain or Ireland, or of paid judge of the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council or of judge of one of Her Majesty's superior courts of
Great Britain and Ireland." To this was added by the APPELLATE JURISDICTION
ACT of 1887 the office of Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and the office of a member of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
mBy 6 & 7 VICT. c. 38 (1843), the number necessary for a quorum was reduced
to three.
66734 & 35 VICT. c. 90 (1871).
639 & 40 VICT. C. 59 (1876). 3 & 4 GEO. V, c. 21 (1913) provided for the addi-
tion of two more Lords of Appeal in Ordinary to both the House of Lords and the
Privy Council. See note 584, supra.
"
9
KEiTH, op. cit. note 650, at 259; I HoLDswoRTH, op. Cit. note 2, at 645.
G702 LOWELL, op. cit. note 582, at 466.
67134 & 35 VICT. c. 91 (x871); 58 & 59 VicT. c. 44 (1895); 8 EDw. VII, c. 51
(19o8); 3 & 4 GEo. V, c. 21 (1913). Each of these enactments limited the number
of colonial judges that might be appointed under its terms. AlM restrictions as to
number were removed by I8 & 19 GEO. V, C. 26 (1928).
ANGLO-AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
British Commonwealth of Nations over which it exercises appellate
jurisdiction, by provision for appointment to it of judges of certain
high courts of India, Australia, Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand
and the Union for South Africa, who are also members of the Privy
Council. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has thus
developed into a great international tribunal heading a judicial
system quite distinct from that of England.
REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The nineteenth century witnessed the most extensive revision of the
judicial system and its procedure in English history. The substantive
law, the separate systems of law and equity, the procedure in the
courts, and the courts themselves had been, as we have seen, the out-
growth of the successive stages in a developing civilization, and with
the advent of the industrial era their antiquated, expensive and
faulty administration of justice became intolerable. The time was
ripe for stupendous change. It was the dawn of that half century of
utilitarian reform, which Professor Dicey termed "The Period of Ben-
thamism or Individualism", 67--an iconoclastic reaction against the
historical conventions and institutions which tended to hamper
the exercise of the individual free will and which found expression
in the great reform movement of 1830.673 "In letters, in science, in
trade and industry, there was on all hands consciousness of fresh
vigour, and expectation of great results. ' '6 74 Jeremy Bentham's
vehement attacks upon courts, law and lawyers had aroused public
opinion,67 but it was the famous speech of Brougham in the House of
Commons in 1828,676 depicting the manifest inadequacies and in-
justice of the existing judicial system and its procedure, which gave
67DIcEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1905) 63.
67 3HEPBURN, Charles M., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING
(1897) 73; DICEY, op. cit. note 672, at 172; Pollock, The Law of England I-L Vic-
toriae (,887) 3 L. Q. REv. 343; Perkins, Willis B., The English Judicature Act of
1873 (1914) 12 MICH. L. REV. 277, 279 et seq.
674Pollock, op. cit. note 673, at 344.
675Dillon, John Forrest, Bentham 's Influence in the Reforms of the Nineteenth
Century, I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1907) 492;
DICEY, lc. cit. note 672; HEPBURN, op. cit. note 673, at 71 et seg. Benthan (I748-
1832) lived to see the launching of the movement which was destined to bring to
the English people that functional justice for which he had fought almost alone
more than half a century.
576- BROUGHEAm, Henry Lord, SPEECHES (1838) 319, Speech on the Present State
of the Law. Brougham was Lord Chancellor of England, 1830-1834.
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definite impetus to the reform movement and aligned with it leaders
of bench and bar. The immediate response was the appointment of
several royal commissions, the most important of which was the
Common Law Commission made up of four judges and five out-
standing lawyers.67 7 During the six years beginning with 1829 it
issued annual reports which then and later formed the basis of sig-
nificant legislative and judicial progress.
7 8
The first great accomplishment was the humanization of the
criminal law and its administration through the efforts of political
radicals and progressive members of the profession, whereby the
number of capital crimes on the books was reduced from the astound-
ing total of more than two hundred to four.6 79 The real property
law, too, was simplified and rationalized. 6 0 A harsh and anomalous
situation was corrected when Lord Campbell's Act of 1846 created a
right of action for negligence causing death and vested it in the
personal representative of the decedent.68 ' Another outstanding
humanitarian achievement of this century of progress was the passage
of the Debtors Act of 1869, abolishing imprisonment for debt, the
shadow of which had hung over the poor and unfortunate for cen-
677The working committee of the Commission consisted of the lawyer members,
headed by Frederick Pollock, K. C., later Baron Pollock, and father of the present
Sir Frederick Pollock, legal historian and writer. It also included Henry J.
Stephen, Serjeant-at-Law. Cross, Prof. Arthur Lyon, Old English Local Courts
and the Movement for their Reform (1932) 30 MICH. L. REv. 369, 378.
67 1 HOLDSWORTH, Op. cit. notes 2, at 635.
6'"Poland, Sir Harry B., Changes in Criminal Law and Procedure Since x8oo, A
CENTURY OF LAW REFORM (190) 43,46; DIcEY, op. cit. note 672, at 29; TREVEL-
YAN, op. cit. note i 19, at 626.
68aUnderhill, Arthur, Changes in the Law of Real Property during the Nineteenth
Century, A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM (1901) 280, 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (Igo9) 673.
SAMUEL WARREN'S novel, TEN THOUSAND A YEAR (1854), satirizing the fictions
and technicality of an action for ejectment, did for property law reform what
DICKENS' BLEAK HOUSE did for Chancery.
The twentieth century has witnessed an epochal reformation of the English
law of real property in the enactment of the CONSOLIDATED REAL PROPERTY LAW
ACTS of 1925. See: Hudson, Manley 0., Current Land Law Reform in England
(1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 341; Johnson, John H., Reform of Real Property Law in
England(1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 6o9; Holdsworth, The Reform of the Land Law: An
Historical Retrospect (1926) 42 L. Q. REv. 158; Bordwell, Percy, English Property
Reform and its American Aspects (1927) 37 YALE L. J. i.
68'THE FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT, 9 & 1O VICT. c. 93. Such an action was unknown
at common law. The act provides that the executor or administrator may sue for
the benefit of the wife, husband, child or parent of the deceased. This act has
been widely copied in American jurisdictions, e.g., N.Y. CONS. LAws, c. 13 (DE-
CEDENT'S ESTATE LAW) §130.
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turies.682 But there was no continuous effort toward thoroughgoing
reformation of the substantive law; the real objective became more
and more the reorganization of the courts and their procedure.
Spasmodic attempts were made to patch up the most obvious
defects in the traditional system by such legislation as the Law Terms
Act of 183o, abolishing the separate courts of Wales and substituting
the English judicial system; 61 but attention was chiefly focused on
procedural reform in the general belief that this would suffice without
radical alteration of the courts themselves. When it came to inter-
fering with judicial procedure, however, Parliament showed a re-
luctance to dictate to the courts. To avoid any doubt of the power
of the judges of the Superior Courts at Westminster under their
ancient rule-making power to effect the necessary procedural reforms,
Parliament in 1833 delegated to them the task of amending by rules
of court the system of common law pleading,M and, thus encouraged,
they took upon themselves the revision of practice as well.6 5 The
result was the famous Rules of Hilary Term, 1834, designed to
simplify pleading and practice at common law.6 Unfortunately,
6832 & 33 VicT. c. 62. Arrest on mesne (intermediate) process, that is, before
judgment, had been forbidden in most situations by I & 2 VicT. c. IrO, §i (1838).
Bowen, op. ct. note 259, at 543 et seg.; Odgers, Changes in the Common Law and in
the Law of Persons, in the Legal Profession and in Legal Education, A CENTURY OF
LAW REFORM (igor) I, x3; Odgers, Changes in Procedure and the Law of Evidence,
ibid. 203, 219. Arrest in an action of debt was introduced into English law in 25
EDWARD 11 (1351) although it had been first developed in connection with the
action of account in the late twelve hundreds. Ford, Richard, Imprisonment for
Debt (1926) 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 27.
Whittier's moving poem, The Prisoner for Debt (1849), was written in protest
against the practice, which was abolished in America before the English Debtors
Act.682See note 530, supra.
6843 & 4 WL. IV, c. 42.
68 The pleadings are those alternate, contending statements of fact constituting
the plaintiff's alleged cause of action and the defendant's answer thereto, made
orally or in writing by the respective parties to a law suit for the information of
the court and of each other. By "practice" is meant those rules and conventions
which govern the method of commencing a case in court and its progress therein to
dismissal or final satisfaction of judgment.
86The Primary effect of these "New Rules" was to restrict the scope of the
defendant's plea known as the "general issue' (a denial in the form of a stereo-
typed phrase) in the respective forms of action. The formula constituting the
general issue differed in the different common law actions and its effect also varied
with the particular action, e. g., the general issue in the action of assumpsit was
"non assumpsit"; in debt it was "nil debet", and in case, "not guilty". The
general issues named were very broad and opened the way for many affirmative
defenses at the trial, that is, evidence in justification, excuse, or discharge of the
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this experiment, though sound in principle, was largely defeated
because the reactionary elements in the profession exploited the
emphasis given by the rules to special pleading, while they attacked
other changes under the doctrine that a statute or rule in derogation
of the common law is to be strictly construed. The consequence was
greater technicality in pleading than ever before.
68 7
Though temporarily retarded in the reform of common law pro-
cedure, the forces of the new era made progress in other fields. In a
second challenging speech in the House of Commons in 1830,618
Brougham advocated a comprehensive system of local courts on the
model suggested by Bentham. To secure them became one of the pri-
mary objectives of the movement. This objective was achieved in
1846 when the new system of County Courts, having a jurisdiction
under £20,69 supplanted the many local Courts of Requests, or
Courts of Conscience, then existing in the towns and cities of the
realm and brought an inexpensive and convenient justice to the out-
lying counties.690 The system then instituted has become a model for
small cause courts throughout the English common law world.
Stimulated by the sweeping changes effected in New York by the
adoption of the Field Code of Procedure in 1848,691 which substituted
for the old dual system of courts of law and equity, with their dis-
tinctive procedures, a single court administering both law and equity
by a common simplified system of procedure, the Common Law Coin-
plaintiff's alleged cause of action. In other words, the plaintiff would have no
notice of the true nature of the defense until it was too late to prepare to meet it.
This provision reduced the general issue to a mere denial of breach of duty or of
the injurious act alleged. Williston, Samuel, Preface to STEPHEN, op. cit. note 251,
at iii. CLARK, Dean Charles E., CODE PLEADING (1928) I5n., says the Hilary
Rules "were largely drawn by Stephen, the great exponent of special pleading",
who, as pointed out in note 677, was a member of the Common Law Commission.
6 8 7Whittier, Clarke B., Notice Pleading (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507; 9
HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 324; HEPBURN, Op. cit. note 673, at 77.
For a celebrated satire of special pleading under the Hilary Rules, see HAYs,
Serjeant George, CROGATE'S CASE, A DIALOGUE IN YE SHADES ON SPECIAL
PEADING REFOii (1854), reprinted in 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2, at 417, and
summarized in POLLOcK, op. cit. note 295, at 27 et seQ.
68"2 BROUGHAM, op. cit. note 676, at 489.
6999 & io VIcT. c. 95. Cross, op. cit. note 677; Odgers, Changes in Procedure and
the Law of Evidence, A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM (1901) 203, 233; I HoLDsWORTE,
op. cit. note 2, at 191 et seg.; HEPBURN, op. cit. note 673, at x87.
69 0n the Courts of Requests, see note 358, supra. Each Court of Requests was
created by a special act of Parliament; in i8oo there were fifty-four such courts in
England. Odgers, op. cit. note 689, at 229; cf. Cross, op. cit. note 677, at 373n.
There were hundreds of miscellaneous local courts which survived the act. Cross,
loc. cit. supra; cf. note 29, supra. 6 91HEPBURN, op. cit. note 673, at 174 et seg.
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mission renewed its efforts. Its reports of I85i and 1853 still recom-
mended extensive adjustments in procedure, however, rather than
abolition of the traditional judicial organization. These recom-
mendations were embodied in a series of Common Law Procedure
Acts of 1852, 1854 and 1860,61 which, among other liberal inno-
vations, abolished special demurrers,693 struck out the historical
verbiage of the old forms of action, made broad provision for joinder
of "causes of action of whatever kind" 94 and rocked the old system to
its foundations by empowering courts of law to grant injunctions and
recognize certain equitable defenses in actions before them.69 5 The
law of evidence was also rationalized by another series of acts per-
mitting the parties to an action at law and their spouses, and other
interested persons to testify.696
A corresponding movement was taking place on the Chancery
side of Westminster Hall. 9 7 The creation of the Court of Appeal in
6"I5 & 16 VicT. c. 76; 17 & 18 VIcT. C. 125; 23 & 24 VICT. c. 126. HEPBURN, op.
cit. note 673, at 177 et seg.
113A special demurrer was a paper used to attack an opponent's pleading for
defects in the form in which it was drawn, and was called "special" because it
pointed out expressly the particular defect at which it was aimed. It gave a great
opportunity for delay and chicanery. The common law general demurrer, on the
other hand, simply raised the issue of the legal sufficiency of the opponent's
pleading on its face. These old demurrers have now been superseded by motions
in England, New York and most other jurisdictions.
6945 & 16 VICT. c. 76, §41 (1852). But the statute excepted the action of
replevin (to recover possession of a chattel) and the action of ejectment (to re-
cover possession of land) and provided that even though two causes of action
were joined, the judge might, when expedient, direct separate trial of the causes.
'9517 & I8 VIcr. c. 125, §79 (1854): "In all cases of Breach of Contract or other
Injury, where the Party injured is entitled to maintain and has brought an action,
he may, in like Case and Manner as hereinbefore provided with respect to Manda-
mus, claim a Writ of Injunction... " Equitable defenses were provided for in
§§83-85 ibid.
6"Bentham had pointedly criticized the existing rules of evidence in his RA-
TIONALE oF JUDICiAL EVIDENCE. Extensive reform of those rules occurred in the
course of the century. LolD DENMAN'S ACT, 6 & 7 VICr. c. 85 (1843), permitted
persons previously incapacitated because of crime or interest to testify; BROUGH-
Am's EVIDENCE ACT, 14 & 15 ViCr. c. 99 (I851), made the parties themselves
competent witnesses; THE EVIDENCE AMENDMENT ACT, 16 & 17 VICT. c. 83 (1853),
rendered the testimony of the spouse of a party admissible in civil actions; and
TnE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT, 61 & 62 VIcT. c. 36 (1898), removed the disability
of one spouse to testify in defense of the other in a criminal case. Several other
statutes during the century made the rules of evidence more logical and more
useful.
69?The first improvements in Chancery practice were along the lines of the
Hilary Rules at Law. They began in 1841 with Lord Chancellor Cottenham's
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Chancery in 1851 and the abolition. of the Masters in Chancery
in 1852 have been previously described.6 8 An act was also passed in
1852 on recommendation of the Chancery Procedure Commission 9
introducing in the Court of Chancery oral examination of witnesses
instead of examination solely by written interrogatories and written
depositions as formerly.700 The real modernization of the court
began, however, with the Chancery Amendment Act of 1858, which
empowered the Court of Chancery to award damages in certain
cases, and to impanel a jury for the purpose of assessing damages or
trying questions of fact before that court itself.70 ' The Chancery
Regulation Act of 1862702 continued this development by requiring
that Chancery should not withhold its equitable remedies in matters
within its jurisdiction until legal title or some question of fact should
be determined at law, but should itself determine "every question of
law or fact cognizable in a court of common law" on which the right
to the equitable relief or remedy depended. These acts, conferring
upon Chancery powers hitherto possessed only by a common law
court, carried further the fusion of the systems of equity and common
law: it was now inevitable that the courts, too, should merge.7°1
Other factors were also paving the way toward centralization of the
superior judicature of the realm. The most important branches of
the ecclesiastical jurisdiction had been transferred in 1857 to the
newly created superior Courts of Probate and of Divorce and Matri-
monial Causes,70 and in i86I, the Court of Admiralty had been
restored to its earlier position of a superior court with an enlarged
jurisdiction.7 5 It was the provision for a common judge to sit in
these three superior courts of diverse jurisdiction that indicated the
Orders of Court, designed to shorten the course of a suit. Then followed the Con-
solidated Orders of Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst in I845; these were further
liberalized by Lord Cottenham in I85O. Hare, Thomas, Preface to ii HARE'S
CHANCERY REP. (1853) viii et seg. There was a revision of the Consolidated Orders
in i86o. 698See notes 258, 269, and 553, supra.
629Hare, op. cit. note 697, at xii. This commission was the first to include lay-
men, two of whom were added to it upon special petition of Parliament. Hare,
op. cit. supra, at x; Sunderland, Edson R., The English Struggle for Procedural
Reform (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 725, 741. Thereafter it became the practice in
England to include non-lawyers on such commissions; the present New York
Administration of Justice Commission includes judges, lawyers, educators,
legislators and business men. (i93i) 3 N. Y. BAR Ass'N BULL. 389. And Sunder-
land, op. cit. supra, at 741, 742. 70015 & 16 Vicr. c. 86 §39.
70121 & 22 VICT. C. 27. 7%25 & 26 VicT. c. 42.
7
13HEPBuRN, op. cit. note 673, at I8I; I HOLDSWORTH, op. it. note 2, at 638;
MAiTLAN, op. cit. note 5, at 471.
7"See note 429, supra. 70See note 473, supra.
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basic trend toward a unified judiciary.7 06 The public dissatisfaction
with the old system of many independent courts of special or over-
lapping jurisdiction in the closing days of the Westminster epoch was
also aggravated by the fact that aside from the superior courts of
common law and the Chancellor's own court at Westminster, the
other superior and subordinate courts, and their offices and chambers,
were scattered all over London and many of them in cramped and dis-
reputable quarters.
70 7
The final phase of the classical judicial system of England opened
with the report of the Royal Judicature Commission in 1869,708 which
declared that "the first step towards meeting and surmounting the
evils complained of would be the consolidation of all the courts of law
and equity into one court, in which should be vested all the juris-
diction exercisable by each and all the courts so consolidated." 70 9 The
common law judges and the chancellors of the time united in support
of the proposal.710 Indeed, it was Lord Chancellor Selborne who
introduced into Parliament the Judicature Act of E873,7" while his
successor in office and political opponent, Lord Chancellor Cairns,
sponsored the supplemental Judicature Act of 1875. 7 2 Both acts
became effective on the same day, November i, 1875.713 These two
great statutes swept away the venerable system and substituted the
Supreme Court of Judicature consisting of the High Court of Justice
and the Court of Appeal. The High Court of Justice is the superior
court of original civil and criminal jurisdiction, and sits in three
T'n COURT OF PROBATE ACT, 20 & 21 VIcT. c. 77, §io (1857), provided for
the appointment of the judge of the Court of Probate as judge of the Admiralty
Court. By the MATRimONiAL CAUSES ACT, 20 & 21 VIcT. c. 85 (I857), the judge
of the Court of Probate was made the judge ordinary of the Divorce Court; how-
ever, the full bench of the Divorce Court included the Lord Chancellor, the three
chief justices, and the three senior puisne judges of the common law courts, and in
certain cases two of them must sit with the judge ordinary.
7
07HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 255, at 25 et seg.; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. note 2,
at 648.
705The Commission was appointed in 1867; it reported in 1869 and again in 1872.
Upon these reports the JUDICATURE ACT OF 1873 was based. Sims, Henry Upson,
The Problem of Reforming Procedure (1912) 21 YALE L. J. 215, 218. For the per-
sonnel of this commission, see Bowen, op. cit. note 259, at 539n .
709
HEPBURx, op. cit. note 673, at 182.
7
10HEPBURN, loc. cit. note 709; Bowen, op. cit. note 259, at 533, 539.
M36 & 37 VICT. c. 66.
71238 & 39 VICT. c. 77; Bowen, op. cit. note 259, at 539; HEPBURN, op. cit. note
673, at 183; Odgers, op. cit. note 689, at 238.
n1 Although the Act of 1873 was by its terms to become effective on November
2, 1874, the SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (COMMENCEMENT) ACT, 37 & 38
VICT. c. 83 (x874) deferred it until November i, 1875.
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divisions: (i) the King's Bench Division, possessing the jurisdiction
of the common law courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and
Exchequer; 7 4 (2) the Chancery Division, replacing the High Court
of Chancery; and (3) the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division,
representing the admiralty and much of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction
of old.715 The Court of Appeal has supplanted the Exchequer Cham-
ber as the intermediate appellate court.
The present English courts, though created by statute, were
dictated by history. He is a wise lawyer who knows the history of
the law and the institutions in which it has been moulded, for there
are times in great cases when, as Mr. Justice Holmes observed in an
opinion but a decade ago, "A page of history is worth a volume of
logic."
716
n4The Act of 1873 created separate divisions bearing the names Common Pleas
Division and Exchequer Division, but these were merged with the King's Bench
Division in 1881. See note z66, supra.
7nThe present system is described in ODGERS, op. cit. note 357; I HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. note 2, at 638 et seg.
n"New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349, 4i Sup. Ct. 506 (1921).
